Speech, Service and Sex: The Limits of First Amendment Protection of Sexual Expression in the Military by Shank, Ross G.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 51 
Issue 4 Issue 4 - Colloquium: Rethinking 
Buchanan v. Warley 
Article 11 
5-1998 
Speech, Service and Sex: The Limits of First Amendment 
Protection of Sexual Expression in the Military 
Ross G. Shank 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ross G. Shank, Speech, Service and Sex: The Limits of First Amendment Protection of Sexual Expression 
in the Military, 51 Vanderbilt Law Review 1093 (1998) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol51/iss4/11 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Speech, Service and Sex: The Limits of First
Amendment Protection of Sexual Expression in
the Military
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 1094
II. THE ANALYTICAL MODEL ................................................... 1103
A. Historical and Constitutional Perspective ............. 1103
B. Systemic Approach to First Amendment Theory... 1107
1. Theoretical Basis ........................................ 1107
2. Exclusion by Categorization and
Limitation by Balancing ............................ 1109
C. Military Speech in the Abstract ............................. 1110
1. Exclusion .................................................... 1110
2. Balancing Interests .................................... 1111
D. Analogous Doctrines .............................................. 1113
1. Clear and Present Danger ......................... 1113
2. Non-Public Forum ...................................... 1114
3. Public Employee Speech ............................ 1115
III. THE MILITARY DOCTRINE .................................................. 1118
A. The Principle of Deference ..................................... 1118
1. Justifications .............................................. 1119
2. Criticism ..................................................... 1121
B. Military First Amendment Cases .......................... 1123
1. Free Exercise of Religion ............................ 1123
2. Civilian Speech ........................................... 1125
3. Military Personnel Speech ......................... 1128
IV. THE EMPLOYEE SPEECH DOCTRINE ................................... 1130
A. Systemic Approach to Public Employment ............ 1130
B. Public Employment First Amendment Cases ........ 1131
C. Public Employee Speech Doctrine in Terms
of the M odel ............................................................ 1138
D. Public Employee Speech Doctrine in the
M ilitary Context ..................................................... 1140
V. SEXUAL EXPRESSION IN THE MILITARY .............................. 1141
A. The Political Nature of Sexual Expression ............ 1141
B. Application of the Analogy-Speech, Service,
and Sex ................................................................... 1142
1093
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1093
1. Sex-Public Concern Threshold ................ 1142
2. Speech-Interest Analysis ......................... 1143
3. Service-Assessment of the Military
Interest ....................................................... 1144
VI. CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 1145
I. INTRODUCTION
[O]ur citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply
because they have doffed their civilian clothes.'
The armed forces depend on a command structure that at times must
commit men to combat, not only hazarding their lives but ultimately involving
the security of the Nation itself. Speech that is protected [by the First
Amendment] in the civil population may nonetheless undermine the effective-
ness of response to command. If it does, it is constitutionally unprotected. 2
Since the close of the Gulf War, the United States's military
organs have endured the exposure of a rash of sex-related scandals. 3
1. Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 188 (1962);
see General Media Communications v. Perry, 952 F. Supp. 1072, 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Citizens
do not jettison their Constitutional rights simply by enlisting in the armed forces .... ).
2. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974) (quoting United States v. Priest, 21
U.S.C.M.A. 564, 570 (1972) (citing United States v. Gray, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 63, 66 (1970) ("[Slpeech
by a subordinate toward a superior in the military can directly undermine the power of
command; such speech, therefore, exceeds the limits of free speech that is allowable in the
armed forces."))).
3. The current round of troubles dates back to allegations of dishonorable conduct by
naval officers toward women at the Tailhook Convention in September 1991. See J. Richard
Chema, Arresting "Tailhook": The Prosecution of Sexual Harassment in the Military, 140 MIL.
L. REV. 1, 1 (1993) (listing a series of sexual misconduct cases in the military). In 1996 the
Army opened a hotline for reporting sexual misconduct complaints. See Paul Richter, Army
Mothballs Phone Hotline for Reporting Sex Misconduct Charges, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1997, at
All (discussing the history of the Army hotline). The hotline received approximately 8300 calls
and over 1200 investigations were initiated, resulting, at one facility alone, in charges against a
dozen soldiers. See id.
Some observers have seen the flurry of accusations, investigations, and prosecutions as
"corroboration of the existence of an epidemic of misogynistic behavior in the military." Margo
Ely, Ruling Raises Questions About Free Speech, Military, CHI. DAILY BULL., Feb. 27, 1997, at 6.
Such critics point to a variety of sexual pathologies associated with the military to underscore
their argument. They note, for instance, the incidents of hazing at the Citadel military acad-
emy, the gang rape of a Japanese 12-year-old by American servicemen, the dramatic increase of
domestic violence concerning servicemen, as well as studies of pervasive sexual harassment
within the ranks. See id. Finally, these same critics observe that "there are studies.., that
suggest a connection between the consumption of pornography and sexual violence," and they
consider any measure aimed at restricting the flow of pornography into military installations a
worthy effort to "snap that link." Id.
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These embarrassments have run the gamut from alarming charges of
abuse of power in integrated training environments 4 to the sensation-
alized, adultery-related discharge of the Air Force's first female
bomber pilot.5 In response, Congress has reconsidered the vexing
issues presented by recently adopted policies that have changed the
roles of gender6 and sexual preference 7 in the military. Lawmakers
have entertained a wide variety of suggested remedies.8 At one
extreme, Representative Barney Frank proposed lifting entirely the
existing ban on sexual relations within the ranks.9 Yet, in the same
4. In 1996, numerous accusations of misconduct concerning Army drill sergeants and
trainees at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in northeastern Maryland were made. See Richter,
supra note 3, at All (noting that out of 1200 calls, 330 investigations were still in progress).
Charges were brought against 12 soldiers at Aberdeen. The ordeal has been called the "Worst
sex scandal in U.S. military history." Id.
5. Air Force Lt. Kelly J. Flinn was the first female B-52 bomber pilot. See Helen O'Neill,
On Eve of Courtmartial, Pilot Seeks Honorable Discharge, BOSTON GLOBE, May 20, 1997, at A3.
Flinn was forced to resign after court-martial charges were brought against her for conduct
stemming from an adulterous affair that she had with the husband of another service person.
See id.
6. In August 1991, Congress passed legislation modifying the exclusion of women from
combat positions in the armed services. See Pamela R. Jones, Note, Women in the Crossfire:
Should the Court Allow It?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 252, 252 (1993) (describing relevant
congressional legislation). The Navy began the use of integrated training environments in 1992.
See Stephanie Gutmann, Sex and the Soldier, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 1997, at 20. The Army
followed suit in 1993. See id.
7. The role of gays in the military shifted following the 1992 elections with the pursuit of
the "so-called 'don't ask/don't tell' policy." Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1421 (9th Cir. 1997).
This program ended the practice of asking recruits if they were gay (don't ask), while retaining
the prohibition on homosexual conduct (don't tell). See id. at 1423 (discussing parameters of the
military's policy). The President proposed his "Policy on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed
Forces" on July 19, 1993; legislation implementing the new procedures was enacted November
30, 1993. See id. at 1421 n.1. In turn, the Department of Defense and branches of the military
issued their own implementing regulations. See id. at 1426. The validity of this policy has been
the subject of considerable litigation. See id. The policy has been challenged on the grounds
that it impermissibly interferes with First Amendment freedom of expression. See id. at 1429-
30. At least one judge has found this argument persuasive. See Able v. Perry, 880 F. Supp. 968,
980 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Judge Eugene H. Nickerson's rejection of this policy). On remand from the
appellate court, Judge Nickerson announced that "[a] military 'called on to fight for the
principles of equality and free speech embodied in the United States Constitution should em-
brace those principles in its own ranks.'" Tom Hays, Judge Revises Rejection of "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell," AP, July 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4873431 (quoting a pending opinion by
United States District Judge Eugene Nickerson). Any analytical scheme encompassing the
First Amendment protections for service personnel will have implications for the current debate
on homosexuals in the military, and, in particular, for the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, which,
as its name implies, revolves around speech and symbolic conduct. Consistent with the analysis
of this Note, a reasonable military finding that homosexual expression disrupts military
function would adequately justify the "don't tell" aspect of current policy. See infra Part IV.D.
8. Congressman Roscoe Bartlett, who sponsored the Military Honor and Decency Act
("MHDA"), has also pushed legislation to require separate training of male and female recruits.
See Sean Scully, Bartlett's Win Surprised Him, WASH. TIMES, June 12, 1997, at C5.
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debate, self-described feminists,1° noted sociologists," and policy-
makers12 alike urged rethinking the wisdom of integrated military
units. No one doubts the authority of Congress to regulate military
affairs. 3 The long-standing tradition of countenancing restrictions on
individual liberties in the military context 4 seems bound for collision
9. See Cassandra Burrell, Lawmaker Proposes Decriminalizing Consensual Sex in
Military, AP, June 16, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4870945 (stating Representative Frank's
intention to introduce such a bill).
10. See Gutmann, supra note 6, at 18-19 (arguing that integration of women into the
armed forces will inevitably cause disruptions such that "regulating sex will become an ever
more important military sideline, one whose fill costs in money, labor and morale we will not
really know until the forces are called on to do what they are assembled to do: fight").
11. See Lionel Tiger, Sex in Uniform, WALL ST. J., May 27, 1997, at A18 (proposing that
the integration "process should be rethought" because the "military needs an honest discussion
of sexuality if it is going to place men and women in situations where sexual impulses can not
be ignored").
12. Congressman Bartlett's proposal endeavored to "provide both men and women the
necessary opportunity to successfully become military personnel without the distractions of
sexuality." Norman Kempster, Lawmakers Call for Sex-Segregated Military Training, L.A.
TIMES, May 9, 1997, at A24 (quoting Congressman Roscoe G. Bartlett). Later, Senator Robert
C. Byrd secured the creation of an independent commission to consider the issue of gender-
integrated training. See Robert C. Byrd, Comment by U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd on the Report
of the Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training (Dec. 16, 1997), available in 1997 WL
12105349 (Gov't Press Releases). The advisory panel, led by former senator Nancy Kassebaum
Baker, declared the proposed reintroduction of gender-segregated training "a step forward, not a
step backward." Andrea Stone & Steven Komarow, Single-Sex Boot Camps Urged; Panel Says
Military Gender Integration Isn't Working, USA TODAY, Dec. 16, 1997, at 1A (quoting former
Senator Kassebaum Baker). Defense Secretary William Cohen decided not to impose the
commission's recommendations of gender-specific barracks and small units on branches of the
services already committed to a gender-integrated approach. See Thomas E. Ricks, Defense
Chief Won't Segregate Sexes in Basic Training, Despite Panel's Views, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17,
1998, at A20.
13. The Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power of military oversight. See U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power," U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, "[t]o raise and
support Armies... [,]" U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12, and "[t~o make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces... [,J" U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14); see also John
N. Hostettler, Judicial Misconduct (May 15, 1997), available in 1997 WL 10571463 (testifying
that "the present practice of the legislative branch bowing to judicial supremacy does not square
with the United States Constitution" and expressing concern that "[wihen a court declares, for
example, that Congress does not have the power to ban pornography in its military
commissaries, it is as if God himself has spoken"). But see Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 768-69
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("I cannot imagine ... that Congress would think it had the
power to authorize the military to curtail the reading list of books, plays, poems, periodicals,
papers, and the like which a person in the Armed Services may read.").
14. Only after World War II did the Supreme Court establish that service personnel had
ascertainable constitutional rights, however limited. In Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953),
the Court held, as Chief Justice Warren later articulated it, that "court martial proceedings
could be challenged through habeas corpus actions brought in civil courts, if those proceedings
had denied the defendant fundamental rights." Warren, supra note 1, at 188; see also Linda
Sugin, Note, First Amendment Rights of Military Personnel: Denying Rights to Those Who
Defend Them, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 855, 864 (1987) (discussing post-Burns development of consti-
tutional rights for service persons). More recently, in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,
507-08 (1986), the Court referred to the custom of permitting the political branches broad
authority over military affairs. Moreover, the Goldman Court justified its deferential policy
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with the present social and political climate that places a high value
on personal rights, especially regarding sex. 5
In late 1996, the Republican Congress 16 passed the Military
Honor and Decency Act ("MHDA") 17 as part of the National Security
declaring that "we have repeatedly held that 'the military is, by necessity, a specialized society
separate from civilian society.'" Id. (quoting Parker, 417 U.S. at 743). Interestingly, Parker
seems to have been the first case to explicitly raise a First Amendment issue. See Parker, 417
U.S. at 768 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("This is the first case that presents to us a question of
what protection, if any, the First Amendment gives people in the Armed Services ....").
15. Commenting on the controversy that arose when an Army panel withdrew portions of
a survey questionnaire dealing with soldiers' attitudes towards pornography, the Secretary of
Defense averred that questions should not "cross the line into areas of privacy that remain
private." Dep't of Defense: News Briefing, June 30, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11936939, at 9-
10. Recent skirmishes over the broadening of sexual "tolerance" have concerned topics such as
homosexual marriage. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Cheney, 943 F.2d 989, 990 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing
the circumstances surrounding the dismissal from the services of a lesbian whose sexual
preference became known to the Army when she revealed her "marriages" to other women in a
Los Angeles Times interview).
Similarly, efforts to suppress "indecent" speech have received increasing disapproval from
the Court. Compare FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (affirming administrative
sanctions against a broadcaster of George Carlin's Seven Dirty Words), with Reno v. ACLU, 117
S. Ct. 2329, 2346 (1997) (reasoning that "[in evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we
have made it perfectly clear that '[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is
protected by the First Amendment' ") (quoting FCC v. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989)). See also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977) ("[Wlhere obscenity
is not involved, we have consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to
some does not justify its suppression."). Indeed, the Court in Pacifica admonished that "the fact
that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it." 438 U.S. at
745. While differences between broadcast media and the Internet explain the Court's
distinctions to some extent, the shift from Pacifica to Reno also reflects generational changes.
See WILLIAM STRAuss & NEIL HOwE, GENERATIONS, THE HISTORY OF AMERICA's FuTuRE, 1584
TO 2069, at 27-40 (1991) (arguing that generations have unique but predictable personalities
and that each transforms social institutions as they move from youth to "elderhood"). In the
First Amendment context, this theory helps explain how process-oriented academics of the
1950s World War II generation could resist McCarthyist suppression only to be replaced as of
the 1990s by individualist Baby Boomers who would condone suppression of "hate speech" on
the grounds that one individuars interest in avoiding the harms of certain speech outweighs
another individual's right to speak it. See, e.g., Neil Hamilton, Academic Freedom Symposium:
Speech: Contrasts and Comparisons Among McCarthyism, 1960s Student Activism and 1990s
Faculty Fundamentalism, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 369, 389 (1996). The personal rights
theories, currently popular in academic circles, would engage in ad hoc balancing to determine
whether sexual expression was worthy of protection. See, e.g., Tona Trollinger,
Reconceptualizing the Free Speech Clause: From a Refuse of Dualism to the Reason of Holism, 3
GEO. MASON INDEPENDENT L. REV. 137, 224-25 (1994) (describing the contours of the expansive
balancing alternative to the methodology of models predicated on the "marketplace" ideal in the
context of "hate speech").
16. Representatives Robert Dornan, Roscoe Bartlett, and Chris Smith sponsored the bill.
Playboy Forum, PLAYBOY, Sept. 1, 1996, at 46, available in 1996 WL 9258262.
17. 10 U.S.C,S. § 2489a (1997). The full text of the Act reads:
Sale or rental of sexually explicit material prohibited. (a) Prohibition of sale or rental.
The Secretary of Defense may not permit the sale or rental of sexually explicit material
on property under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.
(b) Prohibition of officially provided sexually explicit material. A member of the
armed forces or a civilian officer or employee of the Department of Defense acting in an
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Authorization Bill.'8 With the MHDA, Congress set its sights on
"pornographic" magazines, barring the sale or rental on Defense
Department property of materials whose "dominant theme" was the
depiction or description of nudity "in a lascivious way."19 Previous
military regulations of sexual expression had aroused little contro-
versy. For example, during the Gulf War, to prevent discord between
American troops and their Saudi Arabian hosts, publications similar
to those attacked by the MHDA were pulled from commissary
shelves.20 Furthermore, the Navy banned topless dancing in the late
1980s, and armed services authorities have discharged members for
appearing nude in published photographs.21 In early 1997, however,
District Court Judge Shira Scheindlin, a Clinton appointee,22 found
the MHDA unconstitutional.23 A split panel of the Second Circuit
official capacity may not provide for sale, remuneration, or rental of sexually explicit
material to another person.
(c) Regulations. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to implement
this section.
(d) Definitions. In this section:
(1) The term "sexually explicit material" means an audio recording, a film or video
recording, or a periodical with visual depictions, produced in any medium, the dominant
theme of which depicts or describes nudity, including sexual or excretory activities or
organs, in a lascivious way. (2) The term "property under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Defense" includes commissaries, all facilities operated by the Army and
Air Force Exchange Service, the Navy Exchange Service command, the Navy Resale and
Services Support Office, Marine Corps exchanges, and ships' stores.
Id.
18. H.R. 3230. Playboy Forum, supra note 16, at 46. President Clinton signed the Act
into law on September 23, 1996 and the Act went into effect on December 22, 1996. See Ely,
supra note 3, at 6.
19. 10 U.S.C.S. § 2489a. The procedures that the MHDA was designed to change allowed
local exchanges to "[slelect magazines based on merchandising considerations like consumer
demand [and] shelf space." In other words, the MHDA sought to introduce some centrally
established criteria into a wholly market-driven purchasing scheme. See id. General Media
Communications v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 294 (2d Cir. 1997) (Parker, J., dissenting) (quoting
EOP Procedures, 40-11, Special Retail Programs, § 10-2).
20. Playboy Forum, supra note 16, at 46. According to Pentagon estimates, 12.6 million
copies of pornographic magazines are sold at military bases annually. See Ely, supra note 3, at
6. On Army and Air Force installations, Penthouse, a publication of the entity that sued to
prevent enforcement of the MHDA, is the third most popular magazine, selling about 19,000
issues per month. See Joan Biskupic, Military Cannot Ban Porn; Judge Finds Law Is
Unconstitutional, ANCHORAGE DAILYNEWS, Jan. 23, 1997, atA3.
21. Sergeant Bambi Lynn Finney was dismissed in 1981 when she posed nude in Playboy
magazine. See Greg Moran & Darlene Himmelspach, Adult-Video Producer Raps Marine Probe,
S.D. UNION-TRaB., Aug. 20, 1993, available in 1993 WL 7505778.
22. See Thomas L. Jipping, The Danger of More Activist Judges, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 28,
1997, at A19.
23. See Regional Reports, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 3, 1997, at As. Judge Scheindlin read the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning deference to military decisionmaking as allowing
"restrictions of First Amendment rights in the military context only when such restrictions were
deemed necessary to thwart 'a clear danger to military loyalty, discipline or morale.'" General
Media Communications v. Perry, 952 F. Supp. 1072, 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting Brown v.
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Court of Appeals vacated, instructing the lower court to give judgment
affirming the Act.24
At bar, the government had argued that the purpose of the Act
was, in part, to bolster the military's image.25 The government had
also asserted that the Act was supported by congressional findings
that the sale or rental of sexually explicit materials "jeopardized the
military mission of promoting core values [such as] honor, courage
and commitment."26 While the Congressional Record contains scarce
comment linking the measure to any specific strategic military aim,27
such a provision could arguably be characterized as an attempt to
increase unit performance by facilitating the suppression of counter-
productive sexuality.28 Whether such a demand is beyond the scope of
the sustainable de-humanization already expected of an
Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 355 (1980)). She also found that the classifications made under the Act
were in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See id. Finally, she found that the law was
vague in violation of the Due Process clause. See id. at 1082.
24. See Cohen, 131 F.3d at 276 ("Congress, acting under its authority to maintain and
regulate the armed forces, may constitutionally place some restrictions on the speech that
occurs under military command. The Military Honor and Decency Act of 1996 embodies such a
set of constitutional restrictions."). The court of appeals ruled, in effect, that the ban was a
reasonable time, place, or manner restriction of expression in a non-public forum, basing its
decision on the limited impact of the MHDA. See id. at 278-84.
In response to the Cohen decision, Penthouse publisher Bob Guccione pledged further legal
and political action, including a plan to have Penthouse Pets picket military bases to raise
awareness of the Act. See Penthouse Refuses to Take Military Ban Lying Down, MEDIA DAILY,
Dec. 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14506693. The Second Circuit denied the request for
rehearing, and enforcement of the MHDA remained stayed pending decision by the Supreme
Court. See Penthouse, A Shameful Act (visited Mar. 17, 1998) <http'//www.penthousemag.com/
reading/feature/military/center2.html>.
25. See Perry, 952 F. Supp. at 1080 (arguing that the Act was designed to maintain the
"appearance of honor and propriety and professionalism which the military seeks to establish in
the community, and in the world at large") (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 38).
26. See id. (citing Govt. Memo at 17-18).
27. Congressman Dornan, a sponsor of the measure, opined that pornography was "a
frontal, direct, vicious specific assault upon women" and stated that the MHDA would
"help... commanders to take that.., strong, manly, decent line.., to not have this garbage
up." 142 Cong. Rec. H8824 (July 30, 1996).
28. Sexuality has the potential to impair military function two ways: sexual harassment
and consensual sex. Sexual harassment has increasingly bedeviled the armed forces. See
Chema, supra note 3, at 9-15 (evaluating the problem of sexual harassment in the military).
For an argument that pornography constitutes sexual harassment, see, for example, Morrison
Torrey, We Get The Message-Pornography in the Workplace, 22 Sw. U. L. REv. 53 (1992)
(encouraging judicial acceptance of "evidence of the presence of pornography at work as relevant
to establish a hostile environment violation of the sexual harassment prohibition of Title VII").
Among the other difficulties the military faces that are fundamentally the byproducts of sex
between military personnel are those stemming from pregnancy and the "non-deployable"
female soldier which results. Gutmann, supra note 6, at 22. The atmosphere created by placing
large numbers of members of opposite sexes into close quarters on Navy ships has led to these
vessels being dubbed "big high school[s]" and "Love Boats." Id.
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organizational structure that, of necessity, trains its members to kill29
is not the focus of this Note. Instead, this Note's objective is to assess
the appropriate judicial treatment of sexual expression in the military
context by developing an ideal methodological construct and then
analyzing whether the Supreme Court's public employee speech
rulings offer an adaptable methodology. Because the narrow
application of the MHDA lends itself to either the interpretation of
the district court 3o or the court of appeals,31 both courts were able to
skirt the underlying issue approached by this Note:32 How would a
military regulation that criminalized all pornography s3 on military
29. See, e.g., James M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and
Servicemen's Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C. L. REV. 177, 220-21 (1984). The military organiza-
tion is far removed from civilian norms:
The combat infantryman faces the continuing prospect of death, maiming, or injury
while tired, hungry, thirsty, and exposed to the worst extremes of climate. He is
isolated from his normal sources of esteem, affection, and sexual gratification, and
suffers constant, debilitating uncertainty about the intentions of the enemy and his own
superiors. The situation bluntly confronts him with the fact that he is a mere means to
his superiors' ends, of no intrinsic human worth to them, caught in circumstances
beyond his control.
Id.
30. See infra note 34.
31. The court of appeals found that the Act passed traditional time, place, or manner
scrutiny. See General Media Communications v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 287-88 (2d Cir. 1997).
The Cohen court found first that the "military exchanges governed by the Act are nonpublic
forums." Id. at 280. The court then determined that the Act's use of "lascivious" as a defining
criteria was meant to distinguish materials based on their content, rather than their viewpoint.
See id. at 281. This conclusion rests, to some extent, on dicta in R.AV. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377 (1992), and, as Judge Parker observed in his Cohen dissent, is debatable both as a
premise and in its application to the MHDA. See Cohen, 131 F.3d at 291 (Parker, J.,
dissenting). That question aside, the majority proceeded to ask "whether the Act's restrictions
on expressive activity are reasonable and therefore consistent with the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment." Id. at 282. Acknowledging the traditional deference given to
congressional decisions concerning the military and noting that the Act "has not banned explicit
magazines and videos-soldiers and sailors may still buy them elsewhere, receive them by mail,
and read or watch them," the Second Circuit declared the Act valid. Id. at 281, 287-88.
32. The Second Circuit panel seems to have twisted doctrines applicable to purely civilian
speech beyond recognition to reach a decision consistent with its deferential instincts. See infra
Part III.B.2. The ongoing MHDA litigation illustrates the need for conceptual clarity in this
arena, lest principles essential to the protection of speech be watered down and unavailable
when needed.
33. The term "pornography" is used in this Note to refer to materials comparable to those
methods of sexual expression banned by the MHDA but not limited to exclude written works or
books. See supra note 17.
The Court has treated "obscenity" as categorically excluded from First Amendment protec-
tion. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) ("[I]mplicit in the history of the
First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.");
see David Cole, Playing by Pornography's Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 111, 118-19 (1994) (discussing the history of First Amendment obscenity
jurisprudence). Defining what constitutes obscenity, however, has been notoriously difficult.
See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I know it when I
see it."). The Court has laid out a rough guide that leaves much to "community standards."
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installations, without the limitations of the MHDA,34 fare against a
First Amendment 35 challenge?
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974). Reliance upon "community standards"
dangerously places definition of a First Amendment category into the hands of majoritarian
decisionmakers inclined to be receptive to censorship. See infra note 78. At a minimum, the
work must be "patently offensive," Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), and lack "serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to a reasonable person," Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S.
497, 500-01 (1987), to be found obscene. Again, these criteria provide little guidance and Justice
Scalia has commented that the standard implies not a "reasonable man" but a "man of tolerably
good taste." Id. at 504-05 (Scalia, J., concurring). Among the more plausible rationalizations for
categorically excluding obscenity, or "hardcore pornography," is that it is "designed to produce a
purely physical effect." Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity":
An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 922 (1979). Yet,
even this explanation fails to account for the significant blurring between obscenity and
nonobscenity, because nonobscene expression can have a nonintellectual (i.e., physical) effect
and because "sex depiction" has serious intellectual impact. See Cole, supra, at 125-27
(discussing the theory that pornography is not speech because of its physicality).
According to the prevailing Court doctrine, sexual expression that is held not to be obscene
may nonetheless be regulated because it is offensive. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501
U.S. 560, 562 (1991) (discussing totally nude dancing); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729
(1978) (discussing filthy words); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976)
(sexually explicit movies). But see Cole, supra, at 112 (criticizing this doctrine and arguing that
"[if the 'obscenity' doctrine rests on a definition that is internally incoherent, the 'offensive
speech' doctrine rests on no definition at all"). The Court has maintained, however, that
nonobscene offensive speech may not be restricted simply because it offends. See, e.g., Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988) (finding that the First Amendment shielded a
parody of Reverend Jerry Falwell from tort liability for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress). The Court has protected sexual expression not deemed to be obscene. See Erznoznick
v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 206 (1975) (protecting nonobscene nudity presented at a
drive-in movie theater against a city ordinance barring such depictions visible from public
places); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) (granting protection to the words "Fuck the
Draft" emblazoned on a jacket). The Court has summarized its holdings concerning offensive
speech:
[Wlhen the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public
from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the
First Amendment strictly limits its power. Such selective restrictions have been upheld
only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home, or the degree of captivity
makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.
Erznoznick, 422 U.S. at 209 (citations omitted).
34. Judge Scheindlin noted that "a plain reading of the Act shows that it proscribes only
those portrayals of nudity that are 'lascivious.' The term 'lascivious' in turn is claimed to mean
'patently offensive.' Thus, the Act on its face bans protected speech on the basis of its offensive-
ness alone." General Media Communications v. Perry, 952 F. Supp. 1072, 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
And, she continued, "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that
the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable." Id. at 1076. The government had argued that the Act was
intended to prevent sales that "might be interpreted as an official endorsement." Id. at 1080.
Judge Scheindlin found the endorsement argument unpersuasive for two reasons. See id. First,
the Act lacked either a ban on the actual presence of pornography on military installations or a
basis in the record to suggest that sale or rental, rather than possession, caused the harm to the
military's "core values and appearance to the civilian world." Id. Judge Scheindlin's other
criticism of the endorsement rationale was that it was "unreasonable to equate the sale or
rental of sexually explicit material in military exchanges with an official 'endorsement'" since
commissaries continued to sell alcohol and tobacco, which were generally perceived to be
harmful to those who buy them. Id. at 1080-81. Judge Scheindlin also noted that the glaring
1102 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1093
The hazards of judicial reluctance to formulate an approach
more structured than simple deference to military decisionmaking are
apparent in the litigation regarding the constitutionality of the
MHDA.36 This Note argues that the methods the Court has developed
to prevent the chilling of citizen speech when the government acts as
employer include a balancing formula that will sufficiently
accommodate assertions of military necessity. 37 At the same time,
formalizing the protections to which service personnel are entitled
ensures access to public discourse for vital speech and, by providing
consistency of judicial review, promises that liberties will not be
sacrificed unduly in times of crisis.35
Part II of this Note situates the problem posed by military
personnel speech within a larger constitutional and historical
framework. From there, Part II proceeds with an analysis of the
operative theoretical foundations of the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence. It then describes the methodological
construct of categorical exclusions and limited balancing consistent
with both the government process model of the First Amendment and
existing Court doctrines. In light of the government process model,
Part II sketches an outline of the ideal approach to the question of the
First Amendment rights of military personnel. In concluding Part II,
this Note briefly assesses the civilian First Amendment doctrines that
judges and commentators have enlisted to evaluate military free
absence of a factual record to support the classification undermined the government's argument
that the distinctions were necessary to achieve the goals of upholding "the appearance of honor,
propriety and professionalism [and] promoting core values." Id. at 1082. Noting that the
MIDA "created classifications by banning the sale or rental of sexually explicit material that is
presented in audio tapes, periodicals, and films but not sexually explicit material that is
presented in books," Judge Scheindlin pointed out that nothing would stop the publishers of
Playboy and Penthouse from circumventing the law by binding their publications, nor was there
any suggestion in the record that the harm of pornography was more severe when the materials
were in visual, as opposed to written, form. Id.
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. This Note will use the phrase "First Amendment" to
designate protections of speech and expression except when protection of religion is clearly
indicated.
36. See supra notes 31-32. Although the court of appeals may have been instinctively
correct in its conclusion that congressional authority could legitimately extend to suppress
speech in the military context that it could not suppress in the civilian context, "lasciviousness"
is understood in the civilian context to express unconstitutional hostility toward a particular
viewpoint. See infra note 314. Pretending that it does not is inconsistent and arguably
represents unarticulated deference to Congress. See infra note 114.
37. See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Misuse of Separation of Powers Theory in Cases Outside the
System of Freedom of Expression, 38 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 496, 511 (1988) ("[E]arlier cases
demonstrate that the Court is capable of evaluating the impact of First Amendment claims on
insular governmental institutions such as the military and is capable of resolving those claims
on their merits without disrupting the institutions with respect to which the claims are made.").
38. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952).
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speech claims focusing on the justifications for analogizing the speech
of military personnel to that of public employees.
Part III of this Note surveys the existing state of the treatment
of military speech. First, this Note considers the arguments for and
against the "principle of deference" that has served as the lightning
rod of debate at the intersection of constitutional liberties and mili-
tary realities. Then, it examines the Supreme Court decisions that
have resolved First Amendment challenges to military law. These
cases are divided into three distinct categories: those concerning
religion, those concerning civilians on military installations, and,
finally, those concerning service personnel in their professional capac-
ity. This third category, the speech of members of the armed forces,
warrants comparison to public employee speech with direct
consequences for the regulation of sexual expression in the military.
Part IV lays out the Supreme Court's public employee speech
doctrine. After a survey of the critical cases, this Part summarizes
the current state of the construct employed by the Court and then
assesses this construct in terms of the theoretical model proposed in
Part II. Finally, Part IV explores the implications of adapting the
existing public employee speech doctrine to the military context.
Part V then discusses the role of sexual expression in a
government process model of the First Amendment. In conclusion,
this Note brings these themes together, arguing that application of
the public employee speech doctrine to First Amendment interests
implicated by sexual expression in the military context would permit
some regulation of speech unreachable in civilian society.
II. THE ANALYTICAL MODEL
A. Historical and Constitutional Perspective
One of the Constitution's great strengths has been its elasticity
in allowing both culturally acceptable levels of individual liberty in
times of peace and effective societal mobilization in times of crisis.39
39. Perhaps the most extreme instance of deference occurred in Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-24 (1944), in which the Court refused to intervene on behalf of 120,000
Japanese interned for national security reasons by agreement of military officials, the
President, and Congress. Apparently the wholesale infringement of basic liberties seemed
necessary at the time, but the incident has since been the subject of an official apology. See
Karen DeWitt, Japanese-Americans: "Great Day for America", USA TODAY, Aug. 11, 1988, at 31
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The Supreme Court has facilitated these cyclical convulsions by
declining to impose significant restrictions on the powers of the other
branches when national security is implicated.40  The political
question doctrine has been particularly useful in allowing the Court to
avoid setting constitutional norms against situational exigencies.41
Nevertheless, the Court has recognized the paramount functional
importance of the First Amendment and refrained from cluttering its
evaluation of controversies implicating speech and religious interests
with the invocation of non-justiciability. 42
(reporting President Reagan's signing of legislation providing for reparations and an apology to
those interned).
40. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 507-10 (1980) (permitting punishment
of a former intelligence agent for disclosing classified information); Stephanie A. Levin, The
Deference That Is Due: Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Judicial Deference to the Military, 35
VILL. L. REV. 1009, 1059 (1990) (stating that "[jiudicial deference to the military in the face of
constitutional claims for greater liberty, equity, and due process is just one facet of... a wide-
spread judicial reluctance to scrutinize policies and practices declared to be necessary for na-
tional defense"); see also Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 354-55 (1990)
(deployment of the National Guard is not subject to state governor questioning); Boyle v. United
Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 514 (1988) (government contractor defense); Feres v. United States,
340 U.S. 135, 143-45 (1950) (tort immunity); Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost)
Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1305-17
(1988) (enumerating other instances of judicial deference relating to foreign affairs). Courts
have, for instance, notably stayed their hands by declining to interfere with foreign affairs
activities when separation of powers disputes arise during a conflict, whether or not war has
actually been declared. See generally Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990); Ange v.
Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990).
For a different perspective on the intersection of First Amendment liberties and war-time
judicial deference, see Rana Jazayerli, Note, War and the First Amendment: A Call for
Legislation to Protect a Press' Right of Access to Military Operations, 35 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 131, 133-43 (1997).
41. The facets of the political question doctrine were compiled by the Court in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a tex-
tually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political de-
partment; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by vari-
ous departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
42. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1976) (refusing to apply the political
question doctrine to preclude judicial review of First Amendment challenges to the practice of
political patronage dismissal); see also Durchslag, supra note 37, at 499 (arguing that, because
the First Amendment protects institutional values unlike any of the other explicit limitations
contained in the Bill of Rights, "separation of powers concerns, to the extent relevant at all in
individual liberties cases, must stake out different ground when applied to the First
Amendment").
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While, at present, the nation is far removed from the kind of
unifying crisis that engenders wholesale judicial restraint,43 the
current social milieu is notable for its "inner-directedness."44 This
mood is consistent with cyclical, "generational" theories of history45
and leads to inevitable social pressures to expand conceptions of
individual liberties with a focus on self-actualization justifications.46
In contrast, this Note acknowledges that the most coherent
way to explain why speech has been elevated to explicit constitutional
protection,47 while other equally self-realizing liberties, such as
economic liberties, receive mere rational basis scrutiny,48 is that the
deliberative democracy embodied in the Constitution 49 cannot logically
function without the protection of speech.50 Stemming from this
assumption are the conclusions that only purely political speech is
necessarily protected and that such speech is protected absolutely.51
43. See WILLIAM STRAUSs & NEIL HowE, THE FOURTH TURNING 118-20 (1997) (discussing
the timing with respect to "generational" cycles of "concerted national responses" to "foreign
provocations").
44. See id.
45. STRAUss & HowE, GENERATIONS, supra note 15, at 351.
46. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights:
The First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5-9 (1990) (discussing conflict
between individual rights and community interests).
47. The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
48. See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952):
The public welfare is a broad and inclusive concept. The moral, social, economic, and
physical well-being of the community is one part of it; the political well-being, another.
The police power which is adequate to fix the financial burden for one is adequate for
the other .... [11f our recent cases mean anything, they leave debatable issues as
respects business, economic, and social affairs to legislative decision.
Id. at 424-25.
49. See, e.g., C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment Is Not Preferred: The
Military and Other "Special Contexts", 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 789 (1988).
Political power resides ultimately in the people and flows from them; governments
derive their just powers from the consent of the governed; public officials exercise a trust
and are answerable to the people. If we the people are to exercise our role properly in
democratic society, we must be free to express our ideas and opinions and must be able
to obtain information to assure that our opinions, our decisions, are informed.... A
popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern
ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves
with the power which knowledge gives.
Id. at 789-90 (quoting Letter from J. Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in 9 The
Writings of James Madison 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910)).
50. See infra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 30 (1971); see also Risa L. Lieberwitz, Freedom of Speech in Public Sector
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The Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that certain types of
expression are not logically protected by the First Amendment.52 The
Court, however, has also recognized that difficulties discerning
logically protected from logically unprotected speech can result in
over-regulation and self-censorship, leading to the chilling of essential
speech.53 As a result, the Court has developed a series of balancing
tests to limit the application of these categorical exclusions. 54
To preserve First Amendment efficacy in light of the interplay
between historic and constitutional factors, then, the Court must
meet the pressures generated by advocates of the personal rights
model with a doctrinal construct that will yield in times of crisis.55 At
least one commentator has proposed evaluating the constitutional
claims of service personnel with a two-tiered framework linked to the
declaration of war, with non-justiciability during periods of crisis and
civilian norms at all other times. 56 This approach is too radical a de-
Employment: The Deconstitutionalization of the Public Sector Workplace, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
597, 604-05 (1986).
52. Judge Bork argues that "speech advocating forcible overthrow of the government or
violation of law" should be excluded from First Amendment protection. Bork, supra note 51, at
29-30. The Court has recognized similar exclusions for "fighting words," obscenity, and defama-
tion. Lieberwitz, supra note 51, at 614-16 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255 (1952); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484-85 (1975)). In Beauharnais, the Court explained that "[tihere are certain well-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any constitutional problem." 343 U.S. at 255. Listing "the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words" among the excluded
classes of speech, the Court based the lack of First Amendment protection for these categories
on the observation that "such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Id.
53. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (citing Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983)), the Court observed that "speech on matters of purely
private concern is of less First Amendment concern." The Court went on to explain that the
justification for constitutional limitations on state libel law is absent when "[t]here is no threat
to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaning-
ful dialogue of ideas concerning self-government; and there is no threat of liability causing a re-
action of self-censorship by the press." Id. at 759-60.
54. For instance, the Court has adopted the "clear and present danger" test that limits the
advocacy of illegal conduct-such as speech pitched to incite a riot. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 450 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). Another example of a similar formulation is the
requirement of"actual malice" in defamation suits. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279(1964).
55. See, e.g., William Rehnquist, Civil Liberty and the Civil War: The Indianapolis
Treason Trials, 72 IND. L.J. 927 (1997) ("Peacetime offers an opportunity for detached reflection
on these important governmental questions which are not so calmly discussed in the midst of a
war".).
56. See Sugin, supra note 14, at 857 ("This Note argues that only service personnel in
combat during war should be treated as members of a separate community. Most military
personnel should be treated as a part of the civilian community, equally protected by the
Constitution under which the rest of American society functions.").
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parture from the current norm,57 however, for it fails to take into ac-
count the ongoing need for readiness5s that has become essential in
modern technological warfare. 9 Other scholars have defended what
is known as the "principle of deference" to military decisionmaking in
all constitutional contexts.60  This position, however, fails to
sufficiently account for the "preferred position" of speech 6' and the
serious concerns raised by critics such as Justice Stewart, who noted
that "times have surely changed" since the judiciary first adopted its
hands-off approach.62
B. Systemic Approach to First Amendment Theory
1. Theoretical Basis
Scholars have grouped First Amendment theories into two
broad categories:6 3 the "government process," or "systemic," model
A variation on the two-tiered approach was proposed in John Nelson Ohlweiler, Note, The
Principle of Deference: Facial Constitutional Challenges to Military Regulations, 10 J.L. & POL.
147, 151 (1993). This argument maintains that "[slince facial constitutional challenges to
military regulations do not seriously threaten military effectiveness, they do not deserve the
extreme deference afforded the military in other contexts." Id. at 180-81. Consequently,
Ohlweiler argued that facial challenges should receive judicial review and as-applied challenges
should be subject to traditional deference. See id. at 151. This approach, however, suffers from
the underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness that is the inevitable byproduct of bright-line
tests. Ohlweiler may be correct that 'the Court has not always applied the deference language"
in its cases. Id. Still, an equally accurate description finds the Court undertaking to balance
the interests Ohlweiler perceives as justifying a two-prong approach, but merely doing so on a
case-by-case basis.
57. See infra Part II.A.
58. See, e.g., Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 218-28 (discussing the development of the
complex web of psychological interactions between, and internalizations of, individuals in the
military group); see also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) ("Military personnel must be
ready to perform their duty whenever the occasion arises.").
59. Any paradigm that makes its standard of review contingent upon the existence of war
or peace also implicates the uncertainty of war powers disputes between the executive and
legislative branches. Even if the President's ability to deploy troops without congressional
approval were resolved against the Commander-in-Chief through strict interpretation of the
power to declare war, the need for rapid mobilization remains.
60. See Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 182-83; see also Barney F. Bilello, Note, Judicial
Review and Soldiers' Rights: Is the Principle of Deference a Standard of Review?, 17 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 465, 467-68 (1989).
61. Dienes, supra note 49, at 778-79; see, e.g., Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 575
(1944) ("[Flreedom of press, speech and religion occupy a preferred position.. .
62. Parker, 417 U.S. at 781 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
63. See Lieberwitz, supra note 51, at 603. Lieberwitz describes Alexander Meiklejohn,
Robert Bork, Lillian BeVier, and Vincent Blasi as the scholars most closely identified with the
governmental process model. See id. Lieberwitz places Martin Redish and C. Edwin Baker in
the camp of the self-development theorists. See id. Lieberwitz suggests that those theorists
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and the "self-development," or "personal rights," model.64 These cate-
gories differ primarily in the scope of protection that they accord
speech and their underlying understandings of the purposes of the
First Amendment.65 The personal rights theorists support protection
of speech for the expression's significance to the individual's personal
development.66 In contrast, the government process theorists' sys-
temic approach interprets the First Amendment in a mode consistent
with the democratic values of government embodied in the
Constitution.7 To the systemic theorists then, the First Amendment
protects any expression necessary to the functioning of majoritarian
decisionmaking.6s A broad version of the systemic approach requires
pursuing the values underlying the First Amendment in epistemological terms are closely
aligned with the self-development school. See id. at 604.
64. Id.
65. See id. For a general introduction to the comparison of the understandings of the
personal rights and systemic models, see, for example, Lee Bollinger, Free Speech and
Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438, 442-45 (1983); Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression:
An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1137, 1142 (1983); Martin H. Redish, The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 601-02 (1982); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH:
A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15-47 (1982); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERCAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 576-79 (1978).
66. See Bollinger, supra note 65, at 442-45; Lieberwitz, supra note 51, at 603; Redish,
supra note 65, at 594-95; Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1284,
1289-90, 1301 (1983); TRIBE, supra note 65, at 576-79; Laurence Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of
Free Speech, 10 Sw. U. L. REV. 237, 240 (1978). One strand of self-development theory suggests
that the two models differ only with regards to scope and that the values underlying both
theories are compatible. Lieberwitz, supra note 51, at 603.
67. See Lillian BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the
Substance and Limits of Principles, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299, 300-02 (1978); Vincent Blasi, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 538-42; Bork,
supra note 51, at 23; Lieberwitz, supra note 51, at 604 (citing ALEXANDER MEIKLEOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245, 255); see also Durchslag, supra note 37, at
500 ("[In a process sense, [the First Amendment] protects the method by which that fundamen-
tal change can occur, public debate. The First Amendment is, in short, a blueprint for peaceful
revolution.").
As Alexander Meiklejohn stated, the systemic First Amendment values "the freedom of
those activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern.' It is concerned, not with a
private right, but with a public power, a governmental responsibility." Lieberwitz, supra note
51, at 604 (citing Meiklejohn, supra, at 255).
68. See Lieberwitz, supra note 51, at 604 (citing Meiklejohn, supra note 67, at 255).
Proponents of systemic models differ, however, as to the breadth of material they classify as
essential to democratic ends. See id. For example, Meiklejohn included education, arts and
sciences, and public discussion of public issues. See id. (citing Meiklejohn, supra note 67, at
255-57). Meiklejohn suggests that such forms of expression merit protection because they are
"within the range of human communications from which the voter derives the knowledge,
intelligence, sensitivity to human values: the capacity for sane and objective judgment which,
so far as possible, a ballot would express." Meiklejohn, supra note 67, at 256. Robert Bork has
suggested limiting protection to speech directly concerning governmental functions. See
Lieberwitz, supra note 51, at 604-05 (citing Bork, supra note 51, at 27-30) ("Bork would include
in his category of governmental units those in the executive, legislative, judicial, or
administrative branches.").
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protection of speech for its social significance. 69  Phrased as the
"search for truth" or "marketplace of ideas" justification, this view,
enunciated in Justice Holmes's opinions,70 supports protection of
unpopular speech because the conflict of viewpoints will result in the
emergence of truth.71  For the most part, the Supreme Court has
adhered to the systemic theory in fashioning its First Amendment
doctrines.72 This Note takes an approach that resembles the one
Justice Holmes outlined and assumes that expression requires
explicit protection for the benefit of the marketplace of ideas.73
2. Exclusion by Categorization and Limitation by Balancing
Expression that fails to implicate systemic values is not logi-
cally necessary to the constitutional regime and, therefore, is excluded
from the explicit protection offered by the First Amendment. 74 The
Court has recognized these exclusions in such areas as libel 75 and
obscenity.76 Taking libel as an example, simply excluding false
statements from the First Amendment domain is not the end of the
matter. Systemic values may still be compromised by problems
inherent in categorization. For example, the difficulty of definition
and resulting gray area between protected true information and
unprotected false information will always be present.77 In the libel
circumstance, a jury, acting as a microcosm of larger inajoritarian
decisionmakers, will tend to discount the value of unpopular ideas in
resolving this ambiguity. 7s With the risks of losing at trial, or at best
the costs of a successful defense, speakers will tend to self-censor.
Consequently, systemically important speech will be chilled.
69. See Lieberwitz, supra note 51, at 604-05.
70. Id.; see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out."); see also Bollinger,
supra note 65, at 463-64; Redish, supra note 65, at 616-17.
71. See Lieberwitz, supra note 51, at 605.
72. See id.
73. But see Dienes, supra note 49, at 797 (arguing that the marketplace of ideas model
does not protect enough speech and suggesting that speech should be protected because it is a
"liberty activity [that demands] broad protection [for its] intrinsic values").
74. See Lieberwitz, supra note 51, at 614.
75. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255 (1952).
76. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1975).
77. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278-79 (1964) ("[W~ould-be
critics... may be deterred.., because of doubt whether it can be proved in court .... ).
78. See, e.g., id. at 295 (Black, J., concurring) (remarking on the potential for chilling of
speech "where public feelings may make local as well as out-of-state newspapers easy prey for
libel verdict seekers").
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Acknowledging this likely chain of consequences, 79 the Court
has conceived a libel doctrine that attempts to strike a balance
between the government's operative interests in regulating
potentially damaging false information and the value of the speech.80
In practice then, each necessary exclusion requires protecting
logically unprotected speech so as not to impact adversely the
marketplace of ideasS1
C. Military Speech in the Abstract
1. Exclusion
What systemic function is served by expression that occurs in
the military? Much has been made of the irony of asking soldiers to
fight and die to protect constitutional limitations on government
power that the service personnel themselves apparently do not
enjoy.82 This Note contends that, in fact, no marketplace of ideas
exists within the military. This insight underlies the significance of
the Court's continuing characterization of the military as a "separate
community."3 The military system achieves decisionmaking with a
79. See id.
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual as-
sertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads
to a comparable "self-censorship." Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of
proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred. Even
courts accepting this defense as an adequate safeguard have recognized the difficulties
of adducing legal proofs that the alleged libel was true in all its factual particulars.
Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their
criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because
of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so.
They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful zone."
Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)) (citations omitted). In New York
Times, the Court held that a rule that "dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public
debate" is inconsistent with the First Amendment. Id. at 279.
80. Cf Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times, 376 U.S. 254.
81. The importance of the systemic model in the Court's reasoning is highlighted by the
fact that in its analysis of libel law's impact on First Amendment freedom, it noted that "[elven
a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it
brings about 'the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision
with error.'" New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279 (quoting JOHN STEWART MILL, ON LIBERTY 15
(1947)).
82. See, e.g., Richard W. Aldrich, Comment, Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice: A Military Muzzle or Just a Restraint on Military Muscle?, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1189,
1189 (1986); Sugin, supra note 14, at 855; see also supra note 8.
83. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
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top-down model,8 starting with the constitutional attribution of
Commander-in-Chief powers to the President.85  Bottom-up, or
majoritarian, approaches are an anathema to the successful operation
of a military force.8 From the perspective of the military as a discrete
entity, then, all speech either of the service person or on the military
installation is not logically necessary to the constitutional choice of
majoritarian debate and power. Again, however, the analysis cannot
stop there. Some truth lies in the often-stated premise that "members
of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the
First Amendment."87 While an individual's speech occurring in his
military role is not protected, the individual remains a citizen whose
speech remains systemically important. Therefore, to prevent the
chilling of essential speech, the Court should strive for a balance that
takes into account both the interest in an effective military and the
interest in speech of citizens who happen to be in the military.88
2. Balancing Interests
What then are the interests that may come into play if an indi-
vidual's speech occurs when the individual is, metaphorically, either
in or out of uniform? One variable is the systemic importance of the
84. For a general discussion of the military justice system, see Note, Military Justice and
Article III, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1909 (1990); see also Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 218-28; Sugin,
supra note 14, at 860-64. But see infra note 324 and accompanying text.
85. See U.S. CONST. art 2., § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into
the actual Service of the United States .... ").
86. See, e.g., Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 218-19.
The armed forces are an example of a rational bureaucracy: a hierarchical organization
characterized by a specialized division of labor according to system and authority based
on role rather than personality, in which each individual's role is to pursue goals
established by the heads of the hierarchy through methods that they have calculated
will attain these goals. In any such organization the needs and desires of an individual
member may conflict with the demands of his role; if he chooses to follow the former, the
functioning of the organization is impeded. A rational bureaucracy therefore needs a
system of discipline that will induce the individual to fulfill the demands of his role even
when they are inconsistent with his own interests.
Id. Justice Blackmun alluded to the perils of undisciplined forces in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733, 763 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("One need only read the history of the
permissive-and short-lived-regime of the Soviet Army in the early days of the Russian
Revolution to know that command indulgence of an undisciplined rank and file can decimate a
fighting force.").
87. Parker, 417 U.S. at 759; see also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) ("This
Court has never held, nor do we now hold, that military personnel are barred from all redress in
civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service.").
88. Whether the soldier is a voluntary recruit or a draftee will not change this aspect of
the analysis. For a discussion of the merits of the two alternatives, see, for example, Thomas W.
Ross, Raising an Army: A Positive Theory of Military Recruitment, 37 J.L. & ECON. 109 (1994).
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speech. 89 Speech that is nearly pure political speech requires greater
protection than speech that is far removed from deliberative dis-
course-commercial speech ° or visual images, for example. 91 An addi-
tional element of speech valuation is the ability of the system to ob-
tain the information by other means.9 2 A soldier has access to infor-
mation concerning the operation of the armed forces that is highly
relevant to democratic decisionmaking, since the armed forces remain
a creature of the deliberative Congress. 93 The very fact that the serv-
ices are a closed society raises the possibility that when the speech
concerns military matters it will, perhaps counter-intuitively, deserve
greater respect than if it were completely unconnected to the individ-
ual's service.
The second variable to consider is the regulatory interest at
stake.94 In the military context, this interest is the need to prevent
disruption of the pursuit of legitimate military goals.95 Specifically,
maintaining the top-down command structure is of paramount con-
cern.96 As the value of the speech to the political process increases,
however, so does its potential for disruptive effect. That military and
89. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) ("The general
proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment
has long been settled by our decisions. The constitutional safeguard, we have said, 'Was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.'") (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). Cf
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) ("The public interest in having free and
unhindered debate on matters of public importance-the core value of the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment-is so great that it has been held that a State cannot authorize the
recovery of damages by a public official for defamatory statements directed at him except when
such statements are shown to have been made either with knowledge of their falsity or with
reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.").
90. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
91. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
92. See Bruce Bodner, Recent Decisions, Constitutional Rights-United States Supreme
Court Gives Public Employers Greater Latitude to Curb Public Employee Speech-Waters vs.
Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994), 68 TEMP. L. REv. 461, 461-62 (1995) ("[Mlany of the
theoretical and practical leaders of the [managerial reform] movement view traditional, top-
down approaches to managerial control of the workplace as one of the main sources of
inefficiency of government."). Advocates of workplace reform understand that the benefits of
public employee commentary concerning the workplace are a product of the public worker's
intimate understanding of government function. See id. at 490.
93. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12, 14.
94. See, e.g., New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254 (stating that the government's regulatory
interest was in protecting individuals from the damages of defamation).
95. See, e.g., Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 208-18. According to Professor Hirschhorn, the
armed forces' "primary purpose is to fight wars, i.e., to inflict violence on persons subject to
other governments in order to attain the objectives of the United States." Id. at 208; see also
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
96. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 357 (1980) ("Because the right to command and the
duty to obey ordinarily must go unquestioned, this Court long ago recognized that the military
must possess substantial discretion over its internal discipline.").
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civilian societies have distinct, antithetical decision-making proce-
dures means that efforts to manipulate one may constitute attempts
to circumvent the other. Speech on military matters may have no
other source than service personnel, but it poses the greatest threat to
internal military order.
D. Analogous Doctrines
Before turning to the speech of public employees for guidance,
other possible methods of analyzing military speech suggested in the
Court's opinions and academic commentary should be considered.
1. Clear and Present Danger
One existing First Amendment conception that could underlie
the approach taken in cases concerning the military is the "clear and
present danger" test.97  This test ostensibly withdraws First
Amendment protection from speech "directed to inciting or producing
lawless action" that is also "likely to incite or produce such actions."98
Superficially, this standard, which excludes advocacy of illegal
conduct from protection so as to suppress only the most serious of
such advocacy while securing advocacy targeted at, and essential to,
the deliberative process, might seem suited to the military situation 99
when disorder and disobedience are the concern. 100 The clear and
present danger test, however, is designed for a patently different
circumstance. 10 Developed in cases such as those concerning
demonstrations bordering on riots,102 the test aims to protect speech
97. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
98. Id.
99. See Sugin, supra note 14, at 870 (referring to the clear and present danger test as the
relevant civilian standard with which to compare both Parker and Brown).
100. See, e.g., Brown, 444 U.S. at 354 ("To ensure that [military personnel] always are
capable of performing their mission promptly and reliably, the military services 'must insist
upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life.'") (quoting
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975)).
101. Commentators agree that the conduct in Parker v. Levy, the military case that most
resembles advocacy of illegal conduct, did not amount to conduct that would be excepted from
protection under the civilian standard. See Dienes, supra note 49, at 810 n.122 (declaring
agreement with Imwinkelried & Zillman, An Evolution in the First Amendment: Overbreadth
Analyses and Free Speech Within the Military Community, 54 TF. L. REV. 42, 50-70 (1975)); see
also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 766-72 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (finding no danger
generated by Levy's speech); infra Part III.B.3. But see Sugin, supra note 14, at 870 ("Levy's
speech in Parker may have been restricted on the grounds that he was directing his inferiors to
imminently disobey lawful orders to go to Vietnam.").
102. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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that is logically unnecessary to the marketplace of ideas, unnecessary
because it advocates conduct of which the deliberative process has
already disapproved, to protect speech legitimately designed to re-
open the political debate. In the military, no such deliberative process
exists so the distinction between speech directed at influencing the
deliberative process and speech flaunting that process is not relevant,
and the clear and present danger test is not fitting.
2. Non-Public Forum
An alternative approach influencing judicial reasoning is the
established doctrine that tolerates greater government interference
with speech occurring in non-public fora. 10 3 The Court has suggested
that this line of cases is indistinguishable from others involving
"reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on expression"104 and
this view is probably the better one.105 When service personnel
express themselves during the course of their duty, however, the
speech is often disruptive and censored because of its message. 10 6
103. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985); see also Flower v. United
States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972). Flower represents one of the rare instances in which a military
decision abridging speech was not upheld. See id. at 199. The Flower Court held that
where a portion of a military base constitutes a public forum because the military has
abandoned any right to exclude civilian traffic and any claim of special interest in
regulating expression, a person may not be excluded from that area on the basis of
activity that is itself protected by the First Amendment.
Albertini, 472 U.S. at 685-86. In Albertini a civilian argued that the ruling in Flower should be
extended so that public open houses would constitute abandonment of the right to exclude. See
id. at 686. The Court disagreed. See id. The court that ruled on the constitutionality of the
MHDA was presented with a dispute between the parties over whether the sales outlets on
military bases were public or non-public fora. See General Media Communications v. Perry, 952
F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Judge Scheindlin acknowledged that "[r]estrictions of
protected speech are subject to different levels of judicial scrutiny depending on the kind of
government property to which they are applied" and that "[gloverament-owned property has
been divided into three categories for purposes of First Amendment analysis." Id. at 1079.
These categories are: "(1) traditional public forums, which 'by long tradition or by government
fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,"' id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)), "including such areas as public streets, parks and
sidewalks; (2) public forums by government designation that are state-created and opened for
limited public use, for example, university meeting facilities and municipal theatres; and (3)
nonpublic forums that, by tradition or design, are not appropriate platforms for unrestrained
communication-military installations and federal workplaces, for instance, fall into this
category," id.
104. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984).
105. See Thomas R. McCoy, A Coherent Methodology for First Amendment Speech and
Religion Clause Cases, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1335, 1358-59 (1995).
106. See Parker, 417 U.S. at 770-71 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also United States v.
Hartwig, 35 M.J. 682 (A.C.M.R. 1992) (upholding Hartwig's conviction for conduct unbecoming
an officer and gentleman based on sexual innuendo in an "any soldier letter" sent to a fourteen-
year-old student during Operation Desert Storm). For a discussion of Hartwig in the context of
sexual harassment law, see Chema, supra note 3, at 36-37. Relying principally on Parker's
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Therefore, judicial resolutions of these disputes cannot be seen as
making commonsense assessments as to how much unintentional
interference with speech can be tolerated since the interferences in
the military context are not accidental. The Court has been clear in
stating that in the non-public forum denial of access based on the
message will not be tolerated.1°7 For this reason, the Second Circuit's
ruling on the MHDA is especially disconcerting.108 The panel's
intuitive deference seems to have spilled over into its consideration
regarding whether the message itself was being suppressed.109
3. Public Employee Speech
Others have alluded to the possibility that the modern military
establishment lends itself to comparison with the situation of
government employees.110 These commentators note that the armed
analysis that officers are held to a higher standard of conduct, the Army Court of Military
Review determined that the language of the letter was offensive, vulgar, and intended to incite
lust. See Hartwig, 35 M.J. at 683, 685. The Court therefore held that Hartwig's "conduct [fell]
well within the holding of Parker v. Levy which limits an officer's First Amendment rights." Id.
107. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (The
"[s]tate may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as
the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker's view").
108. See General Media Communications, Inc. v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 295 (2d Cir. 1997)
(Parker, J., dissenting) ("[Wie have failed to heed the Supreme Court's warning that 'deference
does not mean abdication .... '") (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)).
109. The prevailing view is that "portrayals of nude men and women designed to elicit a
sexual response illustrate an idea: that lust or sexual desire is good, that men and women are
sexual beings." Id. at 290 (Parker, J., dissenting).
"Indecent" speech, or even "sexually explicit" speech, may be regarded as a category of
speech, and the regulation of such speech is a content-based regulation. To divide that
category between depictions of nudity and other depictions, is yet another division, one
step closer to viewpoint discrimination. But in banning distribution of only those depic-
tions of nudity that are "lascivious," defined as "lewd and intended to or designed to
elicit a sexual response," the government is necessarily attempting to regulate a specific
perspective-a point of view.
Id. (citations omitted).
110. See JAMES JACOBS, SOcIO-LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 28-29
(1986); see also Sugin, supra note 14, at 882-83 (stating that "[tihe law as applied to government
employees . . . is a particularly good model for how the law should be applied to military
personnel"). Sugin argues, however, that "[tihe government can place restrictions on the
constitutional expression of its employees if it has a compelling reason to do so," noting that
"[tihis is the standard test in First Amendment adjudication." Id. Cf infra notes 281-91 and
accompanying text.
The Second Circuit panel also alluded to the possibility of using the government's interest as
an employer to shed light on the MHDA. See Cohen, 131 F.3d at 284 n.14.
We also note that the government's interest in disassociating itself from sexually explicit
materials may be enhanced by the military's role as an employer. Military installations
are workplaces for the civilian and military personnel assigned there; like private sector
employers, the military may have an interest in maintaining a workplace environment
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forces are now very different from military societies of the past."'
One obvious change has been the growth in sheer numbers of indi-
viduals in uniform.112 Another relatively recent development has been
the conversion to an all-volunteer force."3 A third trend, which has
coincided with the technical advancement of military weaponry, has
been the shift away from short-term recruits and conscripts toward
professional military workers." 4 Finally, a fourth change in military
culture has been the emergence of new roles for women and homo-
sexuals in the modern military community. 115 All of these trends
make the services less like the elite they once were 16 and more like
the public employee sector. 117
This Note, however, relies on these factors not because they
make one group more like the other but because the changes reinforce
the systemic significance of service personnel speech. So long as
citizens are in uniform,1 8 individuals whose speech is in danger of
First Amendment exclusion will exist. The greater their number, the
that is efficient and focused on the task at hand, not one littered with materials that are
"intended or designed to elicit a sexual response[.]"
Id. (quoting DOD Directive-Type Memorandum (Dec. 22, 1996)).
111. See Dienes, supra note 49, at 824 ("Yet the military society has undergone significant
changes since the pre-Vietnam War era when the 'society-apart' metaphor dominated . . .");
Kirstin S. Dodge, Countenancing Corruption: A Civic Republican Case Against Judicial
Deference to the Military, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 28 (1992) (discussing the effects of an all-
volunteer force on membership of low-income groups and racial minorities).
112. The armed forces have grown dramatically since World War II. See Hirschhorn, supra
note 29, at 205. Since approximately 1900 when the standing army numbered approximately
25,000 to the 2-million-plus peak of the cold-war build-up, the growth of the armed forces has
far outstripped population growth. See id. at 204-05.
113. The United States maintained a peacetime draft from 1945 to 1973. See CONCISE
COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 193 (1983). Although Parker v. Levy was decided after the expiration
of conscription, it arose from circumstances that occurred while it was still in effect in 1967.
114. See Sugin, supra note 14, at 882-83. The modern armed forces break down into three
classes: 10% have combat-related jobs, 54% have technical jobs, and the remainder perform
support services. See id. (citing Edward F. Sherman, Justice in the Military, in CONSCIENCE
AND COMMAND 21,45 (James Finn ed., 1971)).
115. See supra notes 6-7. The tentative acceptance of long-excluded minorities has been
the result of the weakening of internal resistance to change and the simultaneous increase in
external pressures to open opportunities for service to minorities. See Gutmann, supra note 6,
at 20.
116. See Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 205.
117. The military and civilian work environments apparently share a similar climate when
sex is concerned. See Tony Perry, Scandals in Era of Cutbacks Create Anxiety in the Navy
Military, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1997, at Al (quoting one Navy lieutenant's observation that
"[t]he military is just like the civilian world; there is a lot of fear in the workplace these days.
Managers are afraid to discipline anybody for fear they'll be accused of being unfair or harass-
ing. That can kill a career.").
118. This systemic importance has existed ever since the militia ideal was abandoned for
the efficacy of a standing army, and individuals were both citizens and soldiers in time of peace.
See Levin, supra note 40, at 1023-55; see also Lieberwitz, supra note 51, at 598; Bilello, supra
note 60, at 468-71.
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greater the potential for damage to systemic First Amendment values.
The fact that they come from more diverse backgrounds creates
greater potential for suppression of minority views. The tendency
towards professional, volunteer services reinforces the separateness of
the society, increasing the value to the public discourse of information
from within.
In both the military and public employment situations, the
character of constitutional restrictions on government authority is
necessarily different from the nature of limitations implicated when
the government acts as sovereign." 9  Some commentators have
suggested that the Court has effectively adopted a laissez-faire
economic model to develop its understanding of the limited First
Amendment protection allotted to government employees.120 The
civilian government employee workplace is, however, like the
military, better understood as an exception to the marketplace of
ideas. Therefore, this Note will draw on public employee speech
doctrine to illuminate the analysis in the military speech context.' 2'
The two doctrines have matured together, both receiving significant
attention only relatively recently.122 A substantial counter-argument
119. See, e.g., Lieberwitz, supra note 51, at 598.
120. See id. at 667; see also Bodner, supra note 92, at 486.
121. For further comparison, see Sugin, supra note 14, at 882 (stating that "[g]overnment
employees have a more restricted First Amendment right than the rest of society, and their
position, relative to the federal government is analogous to service personnel") (citing JACOBS,
supra note 110, at 40). Sugin finds that both military and civilian employees are "means to
accomplish the collective national end." Id. (citing Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 234). The
primary functional difference between the two is their sphere of influence, one domestic and the
other international. See id. Moreover, Sugin suggests that both military workers and public
employees "sacrifice personal goals for the good of the country." Id. (citing United States Civil
Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (compelling public
employees to sacrifice their political activism)). Sugin also observes that both groups "are part
of a democratic process that does not always function smoothly without safeguards to monitor
the process." Id. (citing United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (limiting political
activities of public employees to promote efficiency in civil service)). Sugin finds that "[tihe
major difference between civil service and military employees is often only the government
entity that employs them because the content of their work is often the same." Id. at 882-83.
Sugin concludes that the substantial similarities between military service and public service
justify identical treatment of the First Amendment claims that arise in each situation. See id.
122. The principal cases in each line occurred within a decade. See Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733 (1974) (arising from events that took place in 1967); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968) (arising from events that took place in 1964). See, e.g., D. Keith Fortner, Note,
Constitutional Law-First Amendment and Freedom of Speech-Public Employers Must
Conduct a Reasonable Investigation to Determine if an Employee's Speech Is Protected Before
Discharging the Employee Based upon the Speech. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994),
18 U. ARK. LriTLE ROCK L.J. 463, 468 (1996) (discussing the precursors of Pickering and
commenting on the long period of inattention to the subject that preceded it). For a discussion
of the circumstances that led to the Court's consideration of First Amendment protections in the
military, see Allen Resnick, Note, Military Dissent and the Law of War: Uneasy Bedfellows, 58
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to linking military law to civilian law contends that national defense
rationales could then be used to justify curtailing liberties in the
civilian context unnecessarily and harmfully.12 3  Nonetheless,
principled judicial review would seem to protect liberty better than
extant broad deferential principles currently applied in the military
context.124
III. THE MILITARY DOCTINE
Before turning to the Court's rulings on the extent to which the
First Amendment applies to service personnel, an understanding of
the Court's reasoning with respect to the intersection of military law
and constitutional liberties generally will be helpful. 25  These
considerations inform the Court's analysis when dealing with First
Amendment claims and contribute to an appreciation of the interests
that would be balanced in the adapted public employee speech
model.126
A. The Principle of Deference
Faced with diverse constitutional questions raised in the mili-
tary context, 27 the Court has consistently referred to the military as a
S. CAL. L. REV. 871, 883-84 (1985) (focusing on the Vietnam conflict as the genesis of military
dissent).
The "original practice" with respect to military personnel was that they were not entitled to
protection by the Bill of Rights. Aldrich, supra note 82, at 1190.
123. See Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 183-84.
[T]he relation of civilians who are... part of strongly goal-directed organiza-
tions-students, policemen, and government employees, for example-to their superiors
superficially resembles the serviceman's relation to the armed forces. Their superiors
may want to reduce them to the same level of subordination. Unless constitutional doc-
trine clearly defines and strongly emphasizes the uniqueness of the military situation, it
is possible that a false analogy with the armed forces will be used to limit the rights of
others against organizations that do not share these qualities.
Id.
124. See Dodge, supra note 111, at 42 ("When the judiciary asserts as a general, overriding
rule that servicepersons have lesser constitutional protections than other citizens because
national defense so demands, it is in danger of breeding a widespread conviction that
constitutional protections are automatically subservient to national security concerns.").
125. See generally Hirschhorn, supra note 29; Bilello, supra note 60; Ohlweiler, supra note
56.
126. See infra Part IV.D.
127. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300-01 (1983) (racial discrimination suit
against superior officer for allegedly discriminatory behavior); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57
(1981) (equal protection claim brought by registered men for failure of Congress to provide for
selective service registration of women); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 24, 25, 33-34 (1976)
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special case.128 Recently, some commentators have interpreted the
Court's approach as sliding from principled deference into non-
justiciability. 29  Nevertheless, the justifications discussed below,
offered to support the "principle of deference," raise serious questions
regarding how substantially the Court should intervene in the
military sphere.
1. Justifications
The propositions upon which the Court has relied when
invoking judicial deference to the military can be divided into four
general categories:'30 implied textual limitations, 131 the practical
existence of a "separate community,"132 limitations inherent in the
adjudicative process, 33 and the costs of judicial error. 134
First, the Court has suggested 135 that Congress's broad consti-
tutional authority 36 to make rules and regulations for the military
operates as an implied separation of powers limitation 13' on judicial
review of military affairs. 38 For example, the Court expressed reluc-
tance to concern itself in what it perceived as the constitutionally
(challenge of practice of summary courts-martial without providing counsel as being in violation
of the Sixth Amendment).
128. Scholars have referred to the Court's approach as the "separate community" doctrine,
Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 247-48; the doctrine of"military necessity," Major Stanley Levine,
The Doctrine of Military Necessity in the Federal Courts, 89 MIL. L. REV. 3 (1980); and the
"principle of deference," Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447 (1987).
129. See Dodge, supra note 111, at 1 ("[Tlhe judiciary increasingly fails to engage in any
analysis or balancing of military needs against individual constitutional claims and is moving
toward creation of a doctrine that military matters are non-justiciable.").
130. See Bilello, supra note 60, at 475.
131. See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
132. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
135. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983).
136. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 12, 14.
137. See Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
[Jiudges are not given the task of running the Army. The responsibility for setting up
the channels through which such grievances can be considered and fairly settled rests
upon Congress and upon the President of the United States and his subordinates. The
military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that
of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to
interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to inter-
vene in judicial matters.
Id. at 93-94.
138. See Bilello, supra note 60, at 475.
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prescribed legislative function of determining whether women were
necessary to the Selective Service System. 139
Second, the Court has flavored its opinions settling disputes
concerning the military with observations of the armed forces'
uniqueness. 140 In Parker v. Levy, Justice William Rehnquist prefaced
his analysis with tb- observation that the Court had consistently
assumed "that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society
separate from civilian society."141 Consequently, "the military has,
again by necessity, developed laws and traditions of its own during its
long history."142 Justice Rehnquist understood this tradition of
uniqueness to be a corollary of the military's functional role as the
nation's legitimate instrument of waging war. 43 Commentators have
interpreted Justice Rehnquist's remarks to suggest that judicial def-
erence arises from a narrower conception of the rights of service
personnel generally.'4
Third, the Court has further supported the principle of defer-
ence by supposing that the Court lacks the competence to resolve
military questions. 45 Chief Justice Earl Warren explained that this
inability derives from the Court's incapacity to assess the impacts of
judicial decisions on military authority. 46  Chief Justice Warren
perceived the problems presented to the judiciary by internal military
disputes as "alien" to the ordinary judicial experience. 147 This judicial
want of competence, the Court has said, requires a narrowing of the
scope of review of military decisions.'48
139. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 58 (1981) (pronouncing that "[i]n deciding the
question before us we must be particularly careful not to substitute our judgment for that of
Congress, or our own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative
Branch"); see also Bilello, supra note 60, at 476.
140. See Bilello, supra note 60, at 476. Most scholars point to the purposes and functions of
the military as the source of its uniqueness. See, e.g., Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 208; see
also Ohlweiler, supra note 56, at 148.
141. 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974).
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See Bilello, supra note 60, at 476.
145. See id. (citing Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)). In Gilligan v. Morgan, the
Court confessed its inability to imagine a circumstance in which it had less competence than it
did in the military. 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) ("The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to
the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional
military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive
Branches.").
146. See Bilello, supra note 60, at 476-77 (citing Warren, supra note 1, at 187).
147. See Warren, supra note 1, at 187.
148. See Bilello, supra note 60, at 477 (citing Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305
(1983)).
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Finally, the complement of judicial incompetence in the mili-
tary sphere is the severity of the consequences of judicial error. One
commentator has argued that mistakes having disastrous results for
national defense are of a substantially greater constitutional import
than errors made in the normal course of judicial review.149 A
corollary to this argument is the concern that frustrating military
decisionmaking with judicial review could have the perverse
consequence of aiding enemy states. 150
2. Criticism
Advocates of "civic republicanism" 51 leveling criticism at the
principle of deference concede that a separate society exists in the
military, but argue that certain systemic values can be achieved only
by applying civilian constitutional principles to military policies.152
One such critic has reasoned that reliance on military expertise, the
chilling of service personnel speech, and policies excluding minorities
from service are inconsistent with civic republican values.153
Civic republicans and judicial dissenters have directed
arguments at the key justifications for the principle of deference.54
Contrary to the idea of an implied, constitutional separation of powers
limitation, civic republicans argue that the Bill of Rights is without
explicit military limitation and thus applies equally to the military. 55
Civic republicans counter the proposition that judicial competence is
lacking in the military area by reference to the many complicated
areas in which the Court has imposed judicial criteria without
hesitation. 56 Finally, civic republicans argue that national security
149. See Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 237-40.
150. See id.
151. The amorphous civic republican model conceives of political participation and personal
self-development as interdependent. For a general discussion of civic republicanism, see Dodge,
supra note 111, at 17-21 ("Civic republicanism emphasizes the process of self-government rather
than the particular outcomes of this process.").
152. See id. at 17-18.
153. See id. at 25-38.
154. See Hirschorn, supra note 29, at 204-07 (discussing the views of Justices Brennan,
Marshall, White and Stewart); see infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text; see also supra
notes 135-50 and accompanying text.
155. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 766 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Court
stated:
So far as I can discover the only express exemption of a person in the Armed Services
from the protection of the Bill of Rights is that contained in the Fifth Amendment which
dispenses with the need for "a presentment or indictment" of a grand jury "in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger."
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concerns should not end the discussion, because a civil society isolated
from information from within its armed forces is in danger of being
subverted by its own military.157  This critique has merit but
threatens to subject military decisions to unadulterated civilian
standards when weight could be given to such concerns on both sides
of the special balancing analysis that the Court has espoused in its
public employee speech doctrine. 158
Another branch of criticism of judicial deference views the
changes in military culture as having ended the separate society and,
thus, the need for deference. 159 According to this view, the typical
service person is indistinguishable from a civilian because the uni-
formed individual has an equivalent right to political participation. 160
This point is well taken but tends to be offered in support of the
notion that only compelling government interests can justify suppres-
sion of speech.' 6' That conception is the hallmark of the personal
rights model of the First Amendment and inconsistent with the
systemic analysis of this Note. 62  Again, explicit balancing at the
limits of an acknowledged categorical exclusion would be preferable to
encouraging the articulation of compelling interests that could spread
beyond the military under national defense rationales. 63
156. See Bilello, supra note 60, at 480-81 (suggesting that antitrust, securities, and em-
ployment litigation are equally complicated and that the litigants had provided the information
necessary to resolve the concomitant legal issues); see also Dienes, supra note 49, at 822 ("ITihe
role played by [the legislative and executive] branches does not deny the power and duty of the
courts to protect the constitutional rights of military personnel. Certainly the language of the
First Amendment makes no exception.., for the military sector.").
157. See Dodge, supra note 111, at 40-42. Dodge asserts that:
If the courts refuse to question the military and leave servicepersons unprotected by
constitutional or other external civilian restraints, military personnel will come to rely
exclusively on the command hierarchy for benefits and protection, and thus may develop
a loyalty to their commanders that surpasses their loyalty to the Constitution or civilian
authorities.
Id. Dodge also discusses another threat to civilian society posed by lax judicial review of
military authority: internal decline fostered by a failure to encourage political participation in
the military sector may result in civilian political apathy. See id. at 41-42.
158. See infra Part IV.D.
159. See Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 205.
160. See id. ("[The serviceman] participates in civilian society when off duty, enjoys and
exercises political rights, and will probably return to civil life when it is to his advantage to do
so."); see also Parker, 417 U.S. at 782-83 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("In my view, we do a grave
disservice to citizen soldiers in subjecting them to the uncertain regime of [these regulations]
simply because these provisions did not offend the sensibilities of the federal judiciary in a
wholly different period of our history.").
161. See Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 206.
162. See supra Part II.B.
163. For an example of questionable compelling interests intruding upon First Amendment
jurisprudence, see Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 549
(1987) (finding that "the State's compelling interest in assuring equal access to women extends
to the acquisition of leadership skills and business contacts").
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B. Military First Amendment Cases
The dearth of cases on the subject matter hinders analysis of
the First Amendment's role in the military.64  The very different
kinds of claims that are litigated further frustrates development of a
conceptual framework.65 Consolidating them into a single, uniform
line is tempting, but fraught with difficulty. In First Amendment
terms, the cases must initially be split between those concerning
religion and those concerning speech. Furthermore, cases concerning
regulations that interfere with freedom of expression differ
significantly depending on whether a soldier or a civilian made the
claim.166 Recognizing these distinctions is the first step toward
unpacking the precedents.
1. Free Exercise of Religion
For critics of judicial deference to the military, the Court's
most recent decision, Goldman v. Weinberger,67 is the most
troubling. 68  In that case, the Court permitted court-martial
proceedings to go forward against commissioned officer S. Simcha
Goldman, who was found to have violated an Air Force Regulation
barring the wearing of headgear indoors. 69 Goldman, an Orthodox
Jew and ordained rabbi, had insisted on wearing his yarmulke. 70
The Court rejected Goldman's free exercise challenge, reiterat-
ing the familiar proposition that the standard of review for military
regulations entails a degree of judicial deference not warranted in
civilian settings.' 7' Not surprisingly, the Court premised its
164. Only two Supreme Court cases, Parker v. Levy and Brown v. Glines have required
resolution of First Amendment claims made by service personnel. See infra Part III.B.3.
165. See infra notes 174, 177 and accompanying text.
166. See infra Part III.B.2, IU.B.3.
167. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
168. See, e.g., Sugin, supra note 14, at 871 ("The trend away from protecting the first
amendment rights of service personnel reached its extreme expression in Goldman v.
Weinberger."); see also Dodge, supra note 111, at 6 ("The most recent and most ominous case
decided by the Supreme Court with regard to First Amendment rights is the 1986 decision
Goldman v. Weinberger.").
169. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 504-05; see also Air Force Regulation 35-10, Para. 1-6.h(2)(f)
(1980) (stating in part "[h]eadgear will not be worn... [w]hile indoors except by armed security
police in the performance of their duties").
170. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 505. In fact, he had worn his yarmulke at his hospital
station for five years before opposing counsel at a court-martial trial, in which Goldman had
appeared as a defense witness, complained. See id.
171. See id. at 507 ("[O]ur review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment
grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations de-
signed for civilian society.").
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deferential attitude on the inherent qualities of the separate military
community.17 2  More important, the Court stressed that the express
constitutional grant of authority to Congress to "raise and support"
armies necessitated such heightened judicial deference. 173
Because the religion clauses implicate separate concerns from
those of the speech clauses,174 however, cases dealing with religion
should not necessarily receive the same treatment as those concerning
speech.75 In fact, the result in Goldman would probably have been
172. See id. at 506-07.
173. See id. at 508 ("[J]udicial deference ... is at its apogee when legislative action under
the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for
their governance is challenged.").
174. The speech and religion clauses of the First Amendment serve different functions.
Compare McCoy, supra note 105, at 1337 ("The religion clauses embody the express judgment
that the religious preferences of the political majority do not constitute a sufficient reason for
the use of governmental power to restrict the religious preferences of a political minority."), with
Leiberwitz, supra note 51, at 609 ("[T]he Court has been influenced mainly by the governmental
process theories, which are concerned with the contributions of expression to the 'marketplace
of ideas,' the 'search for truth,' and the preservation of a system of 'self-government.'").
Consequently, the concerns that the Court's constructs address in each field are necessarily
different. See McCoy, supra note 105, at 1337. The religion clauses remove matters of religious
significance from governmental control based on the apprehension, which historical experience
justifies, that majorities tend to trespass upon unpopular religious rights. For a discussion of
the historical development of the religion clauses, see, for example, Arlin Adams & Charles
Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559 (1989). As a result, while
speech may be a legitimate object of regulation in the military, religion may not. For a
discussion of the traditional understandings of conflicts between religious freedom and military
necessity, see, for example, Paul M. Landskroener, Note, Not the Smallest Grain of Incense:
Free Exercise and Conscientious Objection to Draft Registration, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 455 (1991)
("The historical accommodation to the demands of conscience suggests that, even in wartime,
conscientious objectors make unique, positive contributions to the community and deserve
respect and accommodation."). Therefore, even in the military context, the Court should apply
traditional standards that bar the imposition of religious orthodoxy or intentionally restrict
religious practice. See McCoy, supra note 105, at 1335. A coherent understanding of the
religion clauses further recommends that accidental interferences with religious liberties be
scrutinized with a balancing approach. See id. For a discusison of the application of the Court's
beleaguered "Lemon test" to the facts of Goldman, see Mary Joe Donahue, Comment, First
Amendment Rights in the Military Context: What Deference Is Due?-Goldman v. Weinberger,
20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 85 (1986). Notably, this scrutiny seems to be the type advocated by
Justice O'Connor in her dissent in Goldman v. Weinberger. See Goldman, 475 U.S. 503, 529-30
(1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated:
The first question that the Court should face here... is whether the interest that the
Government asserts against the religiously based claim of the individual is of unusual
importance.... The second question in the analysis of a free exercise claim under the
Court's precedents must also be reached here: will granting an exception of the type
requested by the individual do substantial harm to the especially important government
interest?
Id. at 531-32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Even outside the military context, the prevailing Court
doctrine permits substantial interference with religious liberties by generally applicable laws.
See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
175. Compare, however, the coherent approach advocated by Professor McCoy. See McCoy,
supra note 105, at 1364-82. Compare, also, Justice Scalia's approach in Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
501 U.S. 560, 579 (1991) (proposing the adoption in a speech controversy of the test adopted in
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the same had the controversy arisen outside the military and the
Court simply applied civilian doctrines. 176
2. Civilian Speech
Religious questions aside, First Amendment claims may arise
in two ways in a military setting. One occurs when restrictions affect
service personnel themselves, and the other when civilian speech on
the military installation is impaired.177 Thus far, the Court has not
treated those cases concerning civilians in a significantly different
manner from accidental interferences occurring in non-military
contexts. 178 The Court has ruled that, although certain military
policies restrict speech that would be permitted outside the military
base, they are aimed not at the suppression of speech but at an
interest inherent in the forum.179
the free exercise context by Employment Division Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
176. Recent developments in the Court's free exercise jurisprudence appear to have rein-
vigorated the Court's decision in Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (holding that the interferences
with religion resulting from generally applicable laws do not raise free exercise concerns). The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993)), purported to overrule Smith, but that law was subsequently ruled
unconstitutional. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997).
For an example of a case in the military context decided by a lower court on the basis of
RFRA, see Rigdon v. Perry, 962 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1997).
177. The reach of military courts-martial was circumscribed by the Court in a number of
cases that preceded substantive challenges such as Parker v. Levy. See Hirschhorn, supra note
29, at 184-85. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), limited the reach of courts-martial to cases
arising from breaches of military discipline. Similar exclusions were deployed for civilian
spouses of military personnel, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), civilian employees, Gresham v.
Hagen, 361 U.S. 278 (1960), and "civilian-type" crimes of service personnel, O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). See Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 185.
178. See infra notes 180-91 and accompanying text. Ironically, United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968), the case that gives its name to the balancing formula used in accidental
interference circumstances in the civilian context has military overtones. See, e.g., Keith
Werhan, Note, The O'Briening of Free Speech Methodology, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 635, 637 (1987).
The O'Brien Court stated:
The constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies and to make all laws
necessary and proper to that end is broad and sweeping. The power of Congress to
classify and conscript manpower for military service is beyond question. Pursuant to
this power, Congress may establish a system of registration for individuals liable for
training and service, and may require such individuals within reason to cooperate in the
registration system. The issuance of certificates indicating the registration and
eligibility classification of individuals is a legitimate and substantial administrative aid
in the functioning of this system. And legislation to insure the continuing availability of
issued certificates serves a legitimate purpose in the system's administration.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
179. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687 (1985) ("[The regulation at
issue] is content-neutral and serves a significant Government interest by barring entry to a
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For instance, in Greer v. Spock, third-party political candidates
were barred from appearing on the Fort Dix Military Reservation by
discretionary application of a base regulation.10 The Supreme Court
permitted this denial over a First Amendment objection.181 The Court
relied on its finding that the regulation had been implemented to bar
partisan campaigning in a neutral fashion.182 While a policy of
keeping anti-war advocates off military bases deprives them of a
forum in which their speech might have the greatest impact,1s3 the
Court reasoned that the fundamental dangers of politicizing the
military84 probably outweighed the interference in their case.185
Similarly, in United States v. Albertini the Court again
encountered a controversy concerning the rights of civilians on
military base by persons whose previous conduct demonstrates that they are a threat to
security.").
180. 424 U.S. 828, 831 (1976). The regulation gave the Adjutant General broad authority
to impose prior restraints on the distribution of printed communications on the base. See id. at
831 (quoting Fort Dix Reg. 210-27 (1970)) ("The distribution of any publication, including
newspapers, magazines, handbills, flyers, circulars, pamphlets or other writings, issued,
published or otherwise prepared by any person, persons, agency or agencies ... is prohibited...
without prior written approval of the Adjutant General ... .").
181. See id. at 840. For a discussion of the doctrine of prior restraint in the civilian
context, see Marin Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of
Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REv. 1, 2 (1989) ("[Tlhe doctrine requires that any government action
which operates as a prior restraint on speech be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.").
182. See Greer, 424 U.S. at 839 (reasoning that "the record shows.., a considered Fort Dix
policy, objectively and evenhandedly applied, of keeping official military activities there wholly
free of entanglement with partisan political campaigns of any kind").
183. The systemic importance of the political involvement of service personnel will be
enhanced when the subject of the speech concerns military affairs for the same reasons that the
speech of service personnel will be of greater value. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying
text.
From the perspective of the service person, cases such as Greer implicate the idea of a "right
to hear." For a discussion of this concept, see, for example, Charles N. Eberhardt, Note,
Integrating the Right of Association with the Bellotti Right to Hear-Federal Election
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Ina, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 159, 165 (1986); see
also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.2 (1980).
184. See Greer, 424 U.S. at 846 ('[C]omplete and effective civilian control could be com-
promised by participation of the military qua military in the political process."). For a general
discussion of this ongoing debate, see Levin, supra note 40.
185. Justice Powell's concurrence in Greer, 424 U.S. at 847 (Powell, J., concurring)
explained the details of the balancing that the Court undertook. Justice Powell first noted the
serious threat to the political neutrality of the military posed by face-to-face campaigning on
military bases. See id. The next step in Justice Powell's analysis found that "the infringement
on the individual First Amendment rights... is limited narrowly to the protection of the
particular government interest involved." Id. More important, "[t]he candidates . . . have
alternative means of communicating with those who live and work on the Fort." Id.
Compare Greer to Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (noting that application of a
compelling interest standard does not allow the Court to avoid serious First Amendment issues
and that "among these serious issues are cases that force us to reconcile our commitment to free
speech with our commitment to other constitutional rights embodied in government
proceedings"). In Burson, the Court held that Tennessee could single out political solicitation
for prohibition within 100 feet of an entrance to a polling place. See id. at 211.
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military installations. 18 6  Albertini was convicted of violating a
statute187 that made it illegal to re-enter a military base once barred
by the commanding officer. 188 Albertini was prosecuted for his
participation in a peaceful demonstration that coincided with an open
house at Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii. 8 9 The Court upheld
Albertini's conviction, finding that the statute was "content-neutral
and serve[d] a significant government interest." 9° Writing for the
Court, Justice O'Connor enunciated the formula commonly applied to
determine whether an unintentional interference with speech
constitutes too severe a burden on freedom of expression, an analysis
borrowed from United States v. O'Brien.'9' Although the assignment
of values to the factors in O'Brien balancing generally remains the
subject of debate, the Court, once again, apparently applied a
recognizable version of the civilian standard when civilian speech was
at issue.
The dispute created by the MHDA also features civilian claim-
ants and provides a comparison to Greer and Albertini.'92 In that con-
troversy, the district judge claimed to refrain from ruling on whether
military installations belonged to a particular class of fora, but never-
186. 472 U.S. 675, 677 (1985).
187. 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1994) ("Whoever reenters or is found within any such reservation,
post, fort, arsenal, yard, station, or installation, after having been removed therefrom or ordered
not to reenter by any officer or person in command or charge thereof-Shall be fined not more
than $500 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.").
188. See Albertini, 472 U.S. at 677. Albertini was an anti-war protester with a penchant for
making his points on military installations. See id. at 678. Consequently, he had earned
several "bar letters" from different bases, forbidding him to return (including one incident in
which government documents were destroyed by having animal blood poured on them). See id.
at 677. Albertinfs bar letter informed him that he was forbidden to "reenter the confines of
[Hickam Air Force Base] without the written permission of the Commander or an officer
designated by him to issue a permit of reentry." Id.
189. See id. at 677.
190. Id. at 687. The Court found that the government interest in assuring the security of
military bases was a formidable one and rejected Albertini's assertion that the existence of
conceivably less speech-restrictive alternatives invalidated enforcement of the bar letter. See id.
at 688-89.
191. See id. at 687-88. The Court stated that:
Application of a facially neutral regulation that incidentally burdens speech satisfies the
First Amendment if it "furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest."
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 377 (1968). The O'Brien methodology assists courts in
deciding whether government activity if genuinely aimed at an interest other than one the First
Amendment protects, over-burdens speech by bringing to the fore the opposing interests and
potential alternatives of the government and the individual. See McCoy, supra note 105, at
1358-64.
192. See General Media Communications v. Perry, 952 F. Supp. 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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theless dismissed the case on grounds that the Act restricted speech
on the basis of its message. 193 This action suggests an underlying
finding that the regulation failed to meet the threshold question of
O'Brien analysis: whether the regulation was actually neutral on its
face. 94
The court of appeals reached the contrary conclusion. 195 While
the key for the appellate court, consistent with O'Brien analysis,196
seemed to be the availability of adequate speech alternatives, 97 that
view glosses over the district court's contention, 198 consistent with
prevailing opinion, 99 that an act such as the MHDA is impermissibly
hostile to the message conveyed by the banned magazines. 2°°
3. Military Personnel Speech
Goldman, Albertini, and Greer all applied variations on the
familiar civilian standards of review.20' Though the cases concerning
religion, civilian speech, and military personnel speech all recite the
language of military uniqueness and implied judicial deference, 20 2 only
193. See id. at 1078. Judge Schiendlin reasoned that "visual images are... shielded by the
First Amendment." Id. at 1076. She further considered that "[tihe Act restricts only offensive
portrayals of nudity." Id. at 1078. Finally, she concluded that "[sipeech may not be restricted
simply because it offends." Id. at 1076.
194. See supra note 191.
195. See supra note 31.
196. Implicit in this outcome is the assignment of relatively low value to sexual expression,
despite the presence of more traditional discourse in the publications subject to the ban. See
Penthouse Refuses, supra note 24 ("The company claimed Penthouse to be the only main stream
national magazine to carry a monthly column specifically for enlisted personnel and veterans.").
197. See supra note 31. The reality, however, may be different since service personnel
overseas have few alternatives.
198. See supra note 34.
199. See infra note 314.
200. See supra note 34. Hostility toward "lascivious" materials was at least in the minds of
the Act's sponsors. See Joyce Howard Price, Court Revives Anti-Porn Law Taking X Out of PXs,
WASH. TmEs, Nov. 23, 1997, at A2 (quoting Roscoe Bartlett as saying that the new ruling
"shows how out-of-touch these purveyors of garbage are with American society").
201. See supra Part III.B.1, III.B.2.
202. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) ("Our review of military
regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional
review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society."); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S.
348, 355 (1980) ("Thus, while members of the military services are entitled to the protections of
the First Amendment, 'the different character of the military community and of the military
mission requires a different application of those protections.'") (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733, 758 (1974)); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837-38 (1976) ("One of the very purposes for
which the Constitution was ordained and established was to 'provide for the common defense,'
and this Court over the years has on countless occasions recognized the special constitutional
function of the military in our national life, a function both explicit and indispensable.").
Likewise, scholars have treated these cases as part of the same line. See Dienes, supra note
49, at 798-816; Sugin, supra note 14, at 864-77.
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the cases concerning service personnel are without civilian counter-
part.
In Parker v. Levy, Army Captain Howard Levy was court-mar-
tialed for "conduct unbecoming an officer" 0 and engaging in behavior
"to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces." 204
Levy was Chief of the Dermatological Service of the United States
Army Hospital at Fort Jackson, South Carolina.2 5 Asked to train
Special Forces aide personnel, he refused on grounds that the order
violated his medical ethics.206 Subsequently, he was heard making
statements to enlisted personnel denigrating the war effort.207 Levy
was sentenced to three years hard labor for statements "disloyal to
the United States."20 8
The Court affirmed his conviction.20 9 Writing for the Court,
Justice Rehnquist pointed first to military uniqueness to justify what
he termed the "different application" of First Amendment protections
in military environments. 210 The opinion referred in passing to the
outlines of a categorical exclusion for certain speech occurring in the
military setting,21' but ultimately subjected the regulation to little, if
any, scrutiny.21 2
In Brown v. Glines, Air Force Reserve Captain Albert Glines
was moved from active to standby status on grounds that he had
failed "to meet the professional standards expected of an officer" by
203. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 737-38 (1974); see Uniform Code of Military Justice, Art.
133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1982); Bilello, supra note 60. For a further analysis of this case, see
Dienes, supra note 49, at 803-13; Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 186-89.
204. Parker, 417 U.S. at 737-38 (quoting Uniform Code of Military Justice Art. 134, 10
U.S.C. § 934 (1982)).
205. See id. at 735-36.
206. See id.
207. See id. For example, Levy said that
[tihe United States is wrong in being involved in the Vietnam War. I would refuse to go
Vietnam if ordered to do so. I don't see why any colored soldier would go to Vietnam:
they should refuse ... to fight because.., they are sacrificed and discriminated against
in Vietnam being given all the hazardous duty ....
Id. at 736.
208. Id. at 736.
209. See id. at 761. In fact, the 1974 decision of Parker v. Levy was the first to directly
address the question. See id. at 768 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that "[tihis is the first case
that presents to us a question of what protection, if any, the First Amendment gives people in
the Armed Forces").
210. Id. at 759.
211. See supra note 2.
212. Critics of the Court's "separate community" line of reasoning find variations on over-
breadth and vagueness analysis in Parker that are unrecognizable relations of their civilian
cousins. See, e.g., Dienes, supra note 49, at 812-13. Even commentators generally supportive of
principled judicial deference to military decisionmaking describe Parker as deploying a
.presumption of rationality" for military regulations. See Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 247.
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violating certain Air Force regulations after he circulated petitions to
several members of Congress expressing his complaints about the Air
Force's grooming standards.213 Similar to the prior restraint on politi-
cal campaigning of which the court approved in Greer, the regulations
compelled civilians and soldiers alike to seek official permission
before circulating petitions on military property.214 The Court upheld
the Air Force's treatment of Glines, reasoning that the regulations in
question "protect[ed] a substantial Government interest unrelated to
the suppression of free expression."215 The Court neglected to
articulate, however, precisely what that interest was.216 Furthermore,
the Court appeared more deferential, allowing the military
"unquestioned"217 obedience to command whereas formerly the Court
had perceived a need for only "effective"28 response.21 9 Of particular
interest, however, is the Court's continued use of language implying
an implicit understanding of the existence of an exclusionary category
for certain military speech.220
IV. THE EMPLOYEE SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. Systemic Approach to Public Employment
The employer-employee relationship, unlike that of citizen to
government, but like that of service personnel to military authority,
does not function according to democratic principles.221 Therefore, the
speech of employees that relates to the employer-employee
relationship, even when the government is the employer, is not
logically necessary to the constitutional scheme of representative self-
213. 444 U.S. 348, 351 (1980).
214. See id. at 349 (quoting Air Force Regulation 30-1(9) (1971)) (prohibiting "any person
within an Air Force facility" and "any [Air Force] member... in uniform or... in a foreign
country" from soliciting signatures on a petition without prior approval from the proper
authority).
215. Id. at 354.
216. See Sugin, supra note 14, at 869-70.
217. Brown, 444 U.S. at 357.
218. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760-61 (1974).
219. See Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 196; see also Dodge, supra note 111, at 6.
220. See Brown, 444 U.S. at 354 ("Speech likely to interfere with... vital prerequisites for
military effectiveness therefore can be excluded from a military base.").
221. See, e.g., Lieberwitz, supra note 51, at 598 ("[Tlhe government acts like private em-
ployers; it controls employees' speech by taking actions such as discharging them for speaking
in ways of which the government/employer does not approve.").
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government.222 Like the service person, however, the public employee
is both citizen and servant of the same government.223  Government
action that impacts the speech of the public employee may chill the
speech of the citizen. The Court has recognized these effects and
attempted to refine the limitation to the exclusion by balancing the
interests of government employer and government employee.22
B. Public Employment First Amendment Cases
Like the contemplation of First Amendment protections for the
speech of military personnel, the articulation of similar protection for
government employees has been a relatively recent development.225
For many years, Justice Holmes's view that an individual had no
right to a government job held sway.26 This Part discusses four major
cases that define the Court's extension of limited constitutional
protection to speech of government employees.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 598-99 (remarking on the "hybrid circumstance" facing the judiciary in
public employee speech cases).
224. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), is an early ease exploring the
interests concerned. In that case, the Court balanced the "requirements of orderly management
of administrative personnel" against the principle of freedom of speech. Id. at 94. The Court
found the statute, which restricted the political activities of certain federal employees, justified
in light of the fear that political partisanship among government employees could undermine
the democratic process. See id. at 96; see also Sugin, supra note 14, at 883-84.
225. See Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 184 ("The Supreme Court had no precedent dealing
with servicemen's constitutional rights on which to draw when it decided Parker v. Levy in
1974."). The only prior case raising a First Amendment issue, Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83,
concerned the claim of an individual who had been denied a commission because he refused to
disclose whether he had belonged to any group on the government's list of subversive
organizations. See Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 186. The Court rejected the First Amendment
challenge in Orloff as it probably would have an identical claim raised contemporaneously by a
public employee. See id. at 186; see also, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
The first public employee case decided primarily, though not unambiguously, on First
Amendment speech grounds was Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See
Richard Hiers, Public Employees' Free Speech: An Endangered Species of First Amendment
Rights in Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit Jurisprudence, 5 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POLY 169,
175 (1993). In Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605-06, the Court re-examined the law that had been at
issue in Adler and declared that "[t]he theory that public employment which may be denied
altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been
uniformly rejected." Earlier protections afforded public employees were articulated as defend-
ing the "freedom of association." Edward J. Velazquez, Comment, Waters v. Churchill:
Government-Employer Efficiency, Judicial Deference, and the Abandonment of Public-Employee
Free Speech by the Supreme Court, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1055, 1059 (1995).
226. At that time, the Court still echoed the sentiments of Justice Holmes that "[a police-
man] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), quoted in Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 395 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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In Pickering v. Board of Education27 the Court addressed the
retaliatory discharge228 of a school teacher for sending a letter critical
of school board policy to a local newspaper. 2 9 Pickering challenged
the discharge, and the Supreme Court ruled in his favor.230 The
content and context of Pickering's speech played a significant role in
the Court's refusal to condone the termination.23' The fact that the
speech at issue had occurred outside the workplace reinforced the
notion that Pickering was acting primarily in his capacity as private
citizen.232  The Court also remarked that the value of Pickering's
speech was higher since he was among "the members of the commu-
nity most likely to have informed and definite opinions" regarding
school funding policy.233
In reaching its decision, the Court articulated a balancing
test,234 purporting to weigh the interests of the government as
employer against the interests of the employee as citizen.235 On the
speech side, the Court considered the value of informed public opin-
ion, the need for uninhibited debate, and the need for citizens to be
able to speak without fear of retaliation.236 The Court called "[t]he
public interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of
public importance"237 the "core value of the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment."238 On the employer side of the balance, the Court
noted the employer's interest in employee discipline, 239 worker har-
227. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
228. Teacher dismissal cases differ from those in the military context most significantly
with respect to the fact that the former concern federal judicial review of state action. See
Sugin, supra note 14, at 886. Nevertheless, the circumstances are analogous and both arise
under the United States Constitution. See id. at 885. Therefore, the systemic functions of the
speech in contributing to the marketplace of ideas are roughly equivalent and a coherent
approach should be applied to both.
229. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 565-66. Pickering's letter criticized the school board's
allocation of funds between athletic and academic programs. Pickering's complaint also dispar-
aged the board's handling of a ballot measure designed to increase school tax revenues. See id.
230. See id. at 574-75.
231. See Lieberwitz, supra note 51, at 639.
232. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. The Court noted that when the "fact of employment is
only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the subject matter of the public communication
made by a teacher .... it is necessary to regard the teacher as the member of the general public
he seeks to be." Id.
233. Id. at 571-72.
234. See Bodner, supra note 92, at 468.
235. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573. The Court stated: "The problem.., is to arrive at a
balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees." Id. at 568.
236. See id. at 573-74.
237. Id. at 573.
238. Id.
239. See id. at 570.
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mony,2 0 loyalty and confidence among co-workers,241 and effective
function of the public agency.242 In Pickering, the Court found little or
no evidence in the record that the teacher's comments affected the
government's interests as employer.243 Consequently, the Court ruled
in favor of the employee.24
The Court re-examined the constitutional status of government
employees in Connick v. Myers .245 District Attorney Harry Connick
had fired Sheila Myers, an assistant district attorney, for her failure
to accept a transfer.246 According to Myers, however, her dismissal
was the result of her circulation within the office of a questionnaire
that purported to measure a general deficiency in employee morale
attributable to Connick's transfer policies.247 The Court ruled that
because Connick could "clearly demonstrate"248 that Myers's
questionnaire had "substantially interfered"249 with the order and
operation of the office, he was reasonable in terminating her.25 0
The Connick Court expressed a "content, form, and context"
test251 for determining whether specific employee speech addressed a
matter of public concern.252 The Court described matters of public
concern as "any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community.253 The Court noted that private expression in a personal
confrontation with a superior can threaten institutional efficiency
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 572-73.
243. See id. at 570.
244. See id. at 574.
245. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
246. See id. at 138.
247. See id. at 141.
248. Id. at 150.
249. Id. at 150-52
250. See id. at 150-154. For the Court, Justice White stated:
We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public
concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the
most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to
review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction
to the employee's behavior.
Id. at 147. Justice White also elaborated on the public employee speech doctrine. See id. ("Our
responsibility is to ensure that citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of
working for the government; this does not require a grant of immunity for employee grievances
not afforded by the First Amendment to those who do not work for the State.").
251. The Court employed a similar formulation to elaborate on the version of the "matters
of public concern" consideration employed in the libel context in Dun & Bradstreet. See Cynthia
L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment
Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 34 (1990).
252. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 138; see also Hiers, supra note 225, at 240.
253. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
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because of its content and also the "manner, time and place in which
it is delivered." 254 The Court also stressed, in terms of context, that
the balance of interests should favor the government supervisor's
decision when the controversial speech arises from an active dispute
concerning the policy criticized. 2-5 The Court further counted the fact
that Myers had not "gone public" with her speech against the
possibility that it pertained to a matter of public concern.2 56
The Connick Court enunciated four separate content categories
of public employee speech with distinct standards of review depending
on whether the employee was speaking predominately as a citizen or
as an employee.257 Speech as an employee on matters of private inter-
est was equated with the speech of private employees and therefore
worthy of no First Amendment protection. 258 A second category, into
which the Court placed Myers's complaint that office workers were
being pressured into working on political campaigns, is speech of
"limited public concern,"25 9 which receives a slightly higher degree of
scrutiny.20 In that analysis, the presumption favors the employer
who reasonably believes the speech will disrupt working
relationships.261 The third category, whose standard of scrutiny was
not discussed, was only alluded to and was posited to exist if "speech
more substantially involved matters of public concern."262 In other
words, this category consists of speech on matters of public concern,
related to the employment situation that the employee made as a
citizen in a non-employment relationship.263 The fourth category
emerged in a footnote referring to "matter[s] inherently of public
concern."264 The Court described this scenario as one in which "an
employee speaks out as a citizen on a matter of general concern, not
254. Id. at 153.
255. See id. ("When employee speech concerning office policy arises from an employment
dispute concerning the very application of that policy to the speaker, additional weight must be
given to the supervisor's view that the employee has threatened the authority of the employer to
run the office.").
256. Id. at 148.
257. See Lieberwitz, supra note 51, at 643.
258. See id. The Court termed this first category "speech on private matters." Connick,
461 U.S. at 147.
259. See Lieberwitz, supra note 51, at 643 ("The Court did not use this exact phrase. The
label for this subcategory is taken from the Court's statement that 'Myers' questionnaire
touched upon matters of public concern in only a most limited sense.'") (quoting Connick, 461
U.S. at 154).
260. See id. at 644.
261. See id.
262. Id. at 645 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 152).
263. See id.
264. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8.
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tied to an employment dispute, but arranges to do so privately."265
The elaboration of these categories reflects the Court's efforts to
articulate formulations to evaluate the systemic value of speech.266
An opportunity for the Court to refine its analysis of claimed
retaliatory discharges was presented in Rankin v. McPherson, after
Ardith McPherson, a constable's office clerk, was fired for a statement
that she made to a fellow employee in a back room. 2 7 Upon hearing of
the attempted assassination of President Reagan, McPherson had
expressed her opposition to Reagan's policies and said, "I hope if they
go for him again, they get him."268 The Fifth Circuit found that the
government's interests as employer were minimal because
McPherson's job did not concern law enforcement directly, even
though her statements might have been understood to advocate
lawless conduct.269  In affirming the lower court's ruling on
McPherson's behalf, the Supreme Court announced that whether the
speech was a matter of public concern was a threshold question
preceding any balancing analysis.270
In Rankin, the Court once more adjusted its cumulated
balancing considerations, noting that "attention must be paid to the
responsibilities of the employee within the agency."271 The Court
found that, in McPherson's case, the speech was unlikely to impinge
on the government's interest in the agency's function since she had
minimal public contact.272 By focusing on the agency function factor
derived from Pickering, the Court apparently found little threat to the
remaining interests of the public employer.273
In its most recent noteworthy ruling on public employee
speech, Waters v. Churchill, the Court determined that an employee
may be fired, regardless of the content of the speech, so long as the
employer reasonably believed that no "substantial likelihood [existed]
265. Id. (referring to Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979)).
266. See Lieberwitz, supra note 51, at 642.
267. 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (addressing the facts stated in detail in McPherson v. Rankin, 786
F.2d 1233, 1236-37 (5th Cir. 1986)).
268. Id. at 378-79; see Hiers, supra note 225, at 251.
269. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 378-79.
270. See id; Hiers, supra note 225, at 253.
271. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390-91.
272. See id. (stating that when "an employee serves no confidential, policymaking, or public
contact role, the danger to the agency's successful functioning from that employee's speech is
minimal").
273. See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
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that what was actually said was protected."274 The Court restated its
employee speech inquiry as a preliminary search for a matter of
public concern followed by balancing of the speech interest against the
regulatory interest. 275
In this case, Cheryl Churchill had been fired from her nursing
position at McDonough District Hospital for a conversation that she
had had with a fellow nurse.276 Churchill was alleged to have said a
number of things critical of certain departments, policies, and
supervisors at the hospital.77 Details of the criticisms were factually
disputed, however.278  Using an efficiency rationale,279 Justice
O'Connor announced that the standard for determining whether
speech would disrupt the workplace was what a reasonable employer
would understand upon reasonable investigation. 20
To summarize, the Court has declared that to be eligible for
protection an employee's speech must first touch upon a matter of
public concern, loosely defined as a matter of political or social
interest to the community.28' Thereafter, some type of balancing of
274. 511 U.S. 661, 677-78 (1994). For a discussion of this ruling in terms of its procedural
due process aspects, see Elizabeth A. Riley, Note, Waters v. Churchill: The Procedural Due
Process Disguise of Public Employee Free Speech Rights, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 893 (1995).
275. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 668. The Court stated that:
To be protected, the speech must be on a matter of public concern, and the employee's
interest in expressing herself on this matter must not be outweighed by any injury the
speech could cause to "the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."
Id. (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
276. See id. at 664.
277. See id. at 665-66.
278. See id.
279. See id. at 675 ("The government cannot restrict the speech of the public at large just in
the name of efficiency. But where the government is employing someone for the very purpose of
effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions may well be appropriate."). But see Patricia C.
Camvel, Note, Waters v. Churchill: The Denial of Public Employees' First Amendment Rights, 4
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 581, 609-11 (1995) (arguing that the minimization of public employee
speech rights decreases efficiency by stifling even constructive employee criticism).
280. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 677-79. But see Justice Scalia's complaint that this formula-
tion adds too much to the doctrine:
Justice O'Connor would add.., a requirement that the employer conduct an investiga-
tion before taking disciplinary action in certain circumstances. This recognition of a
broad new First Amendment procedural right is in my view unprecedented, superfluous
to the decision in the present case, unnecessary for protection of public-employee speech
on matters of public concern, and unpredictable in its application and consequences.
Id. at 686 (Scalia, J., concurring); cf., e.g., Velazquez, supra note 225, at 1113-14 (advocating
abandonment of the Waters reasonableness standard in favor of a test premised on acceptance of
the jury's determination of whether the speech was protected and followed by "genuine
balancing"). Yet in First Amendment terms, jury decisionmaking can have mischievous
consequences. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. The Court has suggested a similar
formulation in its refinements of the standard applied to First Amendment restriction of
defamation law. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761
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the Pickering factors, which isolate aspects of both the government's
interest as employer and the value of the individual's speech, is
necessary.2 2 This analysis looks primarily at the content of the
speech to see whether it is of public concern.283 Consideration of the
context of the speech can serve as a secondary indication that it is of
public concern, if it was made public.284 The context can also reveal,
however, whether the speech poses a significant threat to workplace
discipline. 2m The Court continues to indicate that it will permit the
suppression of public employee speech only for public purposes and
not upon the whims of supervisors. 286 Yet, the procedural adjustment
of Waters places a substantial portion of the determination of the
disruptive capacity of the speech into the hands of government
employers. 7
The cases may best be understood in terms of their holdings.
In Pickering, although the speech concerned the employment relation-
ship, it had occurred in a public context; thus, the Court found no
workplace disruption and the speech was protected.288 In Connick, the
speech concerned the employment relationship but had occurred in a
private context; the Court found significant workplace disruption and
consequently the speech was not protected. 28 9 In Rankin, the content
of the speech was not related to the employment relationship, but the
speech had occurred in a private setting; as a result, the Court found
little workplace disruption and the speech was protected.290 The pat-
tern in Waters is the same as in Connick: The speech concerned the
employment relationship, but had occurred in private; therefore, the
Court left the appraisal of workplace disruption to the discretion of
(1985) ("W]hether... speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by [the
expression's] content, form, and context... as revealed by the whole record."). For a discussion
of the serious concerns that the articulation of this criteria raises, see Estlund, supra note 251,
at 3-4 ("[T]he public concern test eliminates the protective 'buffer' that has existed between the
very core of freedom of expression and any category of speech that is excluded from protection.").
282. For a discussion of the difficulties of applying Connick, see Peter C. McCabe, Note,
Connick v. Myers: New Restrictions on the Free Speech Rights of Government Employees, 60
IND. L.J. 339, 357-62 (1985).
283. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
286. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987) (noting that "[v]igilance is
necessary to ensure that public employers do not use authority over employees to silence
discourse, not because it hampers public functions, but simply because superiors disagree with
the content of the employees' speech").
287. See supra notes 274, 280 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 227-44 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 245-66 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 267-73 and accompanying text.
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the supervisor and the speech unprotected.291 The development of
increasingly subtle context and content distinctions has served as an
elaboration of the Pickering factors originally fashioned to accomplish
the balancing of broadly stated employer and employee interests.
C. Public Employee Speech Doctrine in Terms of the Model
By raising the requirement of a matter of public concern to a
threshold question, the Court has refined the rationale behind the
First Amendment to its narrowest systemic justification.292
Nevertheless, the Court has chosen a method that focuses on speech
made in the role of citizen. This concentration suggests recognition of
the idea that speech in the role of employee has no systemic function
in the absence of a marketplace of ideas to which to contribute.
Furthermore, consistent with the systemic model, the Court
has emphasized evaluation of the speech interest as weighed against
the regulatory interest.293  The Court's search for "content and
context" or "manner, place and time" criteria, viewed through the lens
of its holdings, reflects an effort to draw distinctions that will account
for different speech values. The concern with whether the speech was
directed outside the workplace is a shorthand for saying that the
speech had greater systemic value than speech expressed exclusively
in the workplace. This focus reflects the recognition that the point of
view of the public employee has inherent value to political discourse,
but only when it escapes the workplace and actually enters the
marketplace of ideas. Alternatively, when the speech is of inherent
public concern, as it was in Rankin, and only tenuously connected to
the workplace, the Court will follow through on its promise to prevent
the unjustified chilling of employee speech by requiring a reasonable
finding of potential disruptive effect.294
The Court's consideration of the regulatory interest in prevent-
ing disruption is explicit. To some extent, the content and context
factors also help measure the negative impact of the speech on the
government interest as an employer. If the speech arises from an
internal dispute, it is more likely to be aimed at the non-democratic
decision-making process than at the government processes associated
with the First Amendment. The Connick Court, in particular, was
conscious of the paralysis that could be forced upon government em-
291. See supra notes 274-80 and accompanying text.
292. See Lieberwitz, supra note 51, at 638.
293. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
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ployers unable to terminate employees if the Court succumbed to "the
attempt to constitutionalize the employee grievance."295
Still problematic, however, is whether a formula that places
high hurdles for public employee speech on both ends of the analysis
strikes a desirable balance in terms of overarching First Amendment
values. Does the public employee speech doctrine allow the
achievement of the legitimate ends of the majoritarian democratic
process, while safeguarding that process by protecting as much speech
as possible from over-regulation and self-censorship? The threshold
question, whether the speech at issue touches upon a matter of public
concern, reflects the understanding of the dichotomy between logically
protected and unprotected speech but creates definitional problems
with potentially chilling effects.296 Yet, this requirement seems to be a
constitutional criterion within the Court's discretion.297 Therefore,
although definitional problems persist, the potential for over-
regulation and self-censorship is minimized when the decision is
taken out of the hands of majoritarian or self-interested institutions.
Nevertheless, much discretion has been left in the hands of public
employers by permitting government supervisors to make their
decisions based on their reasonable observations.298 Seemingly,
however, the invocation of the reasonableness standard is an implicit
understanding of the original notion that government employment
was a privilege and not a right.299
295. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983); see also Estlund, supra note 251, at 12.
296. The enunciation of "public concern" criteria's gravest potential danger is that cases
will generate precedents as to what is, and what is not, a matter of public concern. See Estlund,
supra note 251, at 3-4. By virtue of stare decisis such rulings could lead to the inversion of First
Amendment principles through the creation of judicially sanctioned categories of permissible
speech. See id. The counter-argument to concerns about the potency of"public concern" rulings
is that these fears presume that the Court is articulating categories of inclusion, when, as this
Note supposes, "public concern" is a pivotal factor in limiting a far broader categorical exclusion
of speech outside the "marketplace of ideas."
297. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 n.7 ("The inquiry into the protected status of speech is
one of law, not fact."). Efforts to define public concern as being of social or political interest to
the community resemble the majoritarian elements of the definition of obscenity. See supra
note 33. This formulation, however, rests on steadier foundations when control remains in the
hands of the Court, rather than jurors and legislators.
298. Justice O'Connor supported the view that "the propriety of a proposed procedure must
turn on the particular context in which the question arises-on the cost of the procedure and the
relative magnitude and constitutional significance of the risks it would decrease and increase."
Waters v. Churchill, 54 U.S. 661, 671 (1994).
299. See supra note 226.
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D. Public Employee Speech Doctrine in the Military Context
While special consideration of the military situation will de-
termine the precise contours of adapted employee speech analysis, the
operative concepts should prove practicable in the military environ-
ment. The Court's constriction of the systemic rationale for First
Amendment protections to its narrowest base makes particular sense
in the military because the arguments made on behalf of judicial
deference have enduring merit. 00 The categorical exclusion of speech
in the military flows from the necessarily authoritarian cast of
military decisionmaking.30l To this extent, the military and public
employee sectors are different because the establishment of a
deliberative democracy merely implies that no marketplace of ideas
logically exists beyond its framework, while the Constitution
explicitly provides for authoritarian military institutions.302 The
military is also different from the public sector because the demands
it places on the individual are greater. The greater involvement in
the individual's life will necessarily make the potential for disruptive
impact broader as well.303 In effect, fewer situations will exist in
which the speech will not significantly affect the government's
interest in order and discipline.
The content and context factors of the public employee doctrine
should translate readily into the military circumstance. 304 For in-
stance, expression directed outside the military context will be more
readily identifiable as valuable, political speech with the caveat that
the broader scope of the military's jurisdiction over the individual will
extend the sphere of potential for disruption of legitimate military
interests. 30 5 In terms of content, speech that arises from internal
military disputes, regardless of whether it is on a matter of public
concern, has substantial potential for interfering with the military
300. See supra Part III.A.1.
301. See supra Part II.C.1.
302. The supporters of the Constitution acknowledged that the Constitution provided for a
potentially powerful military. See Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 212. For example, Hamilton
said, "These powers ought to exist without limitation: Because it is impossible to foresee or
define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the corresponding extent of the means
which may be necessary to satisfy them." Id. at 212 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 147
(Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)).
303. See, e.g., United States v. Hartwig, 35 M.J. 682, 682 (A.C.M.R. 1992) (finding conduct
unbecoming an officer in a serviceman's letter to a civilian); see also note 106.
304. See supra note 228. Standards accurately reflecting fundamental First Amendment
values are more easily justified when applied to the federal government, if only for textual
reasons. See Sugin, supra note 14, at 885.
305. See supra note 29.
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fimction.3  Furthermore, allowing military decisionmakers to act
upon reasonable belief that the employer's functional interests out-
weigh the employee's speech interests comports with the authoritar-
ian military structure as easily as it does with that of public bureauc-
racies. The reasonableness standard is perhaps more fitting in the
military in which reliance on chain-of-command bestows broad
authority on immediate superiors, since combat realities often isolate
units.307
The adaptation of a unified military and public employee
speech doctrine that more explicitly achieves underlying First
Amendment objectives would not change the outcome of cases like
Brown v. Glines30 8 and Parker v. Levy. 30 9 Glines's effort to change
military policy arose from an internal dispute, which would probably
have undermined his claim when balanced against the Air Force's
demonstrable interest in maintaining control over internal discourse.
Similarly, Levy's harangues occurred in a context extremely
threatening to military order and discipline. Thus, the adapted
approach will yield results consistent with prior rulings, but without
depending on the injudicious principle of deference.
V. SEXUAL EXPRESSION IN THE MILITARY
A. The Political Nature of Sexual Expression
Evaluation of congressional statutes or military regulations
restricting sexual expression within the armed forces requires an
understanding of whether sexual speech can ever reach a matter of
public concern.310 The Court has been inclined to label sexual expres-
sion as "less valuable" than political speech without much justifica-
tion.3" Professor David Cole has argued that First Amendment
principles suggest that the opposite is true and that First Amendment
protection is most needed for speech that the majority disdains.312
306. See supra Part III.B.3.
307. See Hischhorn, supra note 29, at 218-19.
308. See supra note 213-20 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 203-12 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
311. Cole, supra note 33, at 123.
312. See id. at 123-24. But see Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment,
1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 627 (defending anti-pornography legislation by arguing that "seemingly
viewpoint-based restrictions are sometimes upheld when sufficient harm is present").
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More importantly, however, sexual expression can have acute political
significance. 313 Feminist efforts to regulate pornography are often
premised on hostility for the message it conveys: the subordination of
women.
31 4
B. Application of the Analogy-Speech, Service, and Sex
With respect to speech concerning sex, extending First
Amendment protections similar to those afforded public employees to
armed forces personnel entails an initial "public concern" inquiry.
Crossing that threshold, the analysis turns to a comparison of speech
and military interests.
1. Sex-Public Concern Threshold
Notwithstanding the political import of pornography,315 sexual
expression will have difficulty rising to the level of a matter of public
concern in the public employee speech model.316  The types of
government employee speech that the Supreme Court and lower
courts have protected have typically been speech addressing
313. See Cole, supra note 33, at 123.
314. See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985)
(rejecting anti-pornography law for content-specific restriction of protected expression). "Under
the First Amendment the government must leave to the people the evaluation of ideas .... In
the language of the legislature, '[plornography is central in creating and maintaining sex as a
basis of discrimination.'... Yet this simply demonstrates the power of pornography as speech."
Id. at 327-29 (Easterbrook, J.). Nevertheless, advocates of sexual censorship insist that the
First Amendment was not "designed" to protect sexual expression because pornography's
fundamental harm is not "its capacity to shock and offend, but, rather, its tendency to corrupt
and deprave." Robert P. George, Making Children Moral: Pornography, Parents, and the Public
Interest, 29 ARiz. ST. L.J. 569, 571-72 (1997) (maintaining that Judge Scheindlin's original
refusal to allow enforcement of the MHDA illustrates judicial failure to recognize legislative
authority to "uphold public morality ... by protecting people.., from the morally corrosive
effects of pornography"). Like the arguments used to defend the law struck down in Hudnut,
appeals to the vulnerability of morality simply reinforce the power of pornography as speech.
See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 327-29; see also supra note 70.
315. See Cole, supra note 33, at 123. For a presentation of both sides of the debate over the
harms and benefits of pornography, see, for example, PORNOGRAPHY: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS
(Carol Wekesser ed., 1997).
316. But see Cole, supra note 33, at 131-39 (arguing that the impulse to censor pornography
is a response to the threat that pornography poses to societal norms). Professor Cole further
notes that recent disputes have centered not on discreet red light districts but on provocative
public displays such as a homosexual's "coming out." Id. at 135. Professor Cole also argues that
allowing regulation of a private matter that becomes public inverts fundamental values
underlying the First Amendment, which "protects an 'uninhibited, robust and wide-open' public
debate." Id. at 152 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
For a discussion of the connection between sexual expression and military culture see
Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War And Military Culture, 45 DUKE L.J. 651, 706-17
(1996).
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workplace corruption or "substantive issues that could influence the
public's perception of the... [d]epartment."317 Nevertheless, in the
context of a public debate over whether men and women can be
barracked together without costly consequences in terms of military
efficiency, sexual expression becomes highly political and relevant,
especially when the debate turns to the sociological arguments that
suggest a close link between sex and war.318
In addition, although the urge to censor sexual expression
stems from a breaching of societal norms of the public/private distinc-
tion,319 most sexual expression remains private. To the extent sexual
messages are directed at others in the military hierarchy, they could
be just as disruptive to the military environment as personally
threatening speech is in the employer-employee relationship.320 Such
sexual expression, however, is generally private and reserved for non-
threatening situations.3 21 Thus, the speech starts to resemble the
protected speech of Rankin, which had little de-stabilizing impact.
Nonetheless, the extensive reach of military authority into the lives of
service personnel creates the likelihood that what was private for the
citizen will be "public" for the soldier.322
2. Speech-Interest Analysis
Assuming that sexual expression, or in other words pornogra-
phy, is of public concern leads to the question whether the value of the
speech outweighs its disruptive impact. Again, when the speech has
greater value because it relates to a subject matter within the
personal experience of the soldier, its potential to disrupt the
regulatory interest in effective command also increases. 323 Therefore,
the context analysis will necessarily be somewhat different in the
military situation. While on active duty, the military demands the
317. Maples v. Martin, 858 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1988).
318. For example, consider the military culture that would "reward officers for a successful
venture in the Persian Gulf... with alcohol, strippers and pornography." Yxta Murray, Sexual
Harassment in the Military, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 279, 297 (1994).
319. See supra note 316.
320. Cf Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
321. See Cole, supra note 33, at 135-36 ("The community has reached something of a
compromise with pornographers; pornographers can and do flourish, as long as they know their
proper place (the 'privacy' of homes and the 'red-light districts' of towns).").
322. See Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 218-22 (discussing the pervasive impact of military
sociology on the individual); see also Cole, supra note 33, at 131-40 (discussing the breach of the
public/private distinction that underlies the social threat posed by pornography).
323. See supra Part II.C.2.
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individual's full compliance in all aspects of his life. 324 Since military
obligation permeates the soldier's existence, few contexts will arise in
which deviation from imposed norms will not potentially threaten the
maintenance of military discipline. Moreover as a result of the
reasonableness standard to which the evaluations of supervisors and
superiors are held, controversies will generally be resolved in favor of
the military decisionmakers. Important differences exist, however,
between adapted public employee criteria and simple judicial
deference. First, the military will have to produce a credible record to
back up the claim of military necessity.325 Second, the possibility of
judicial review itself will deter policies based only on dubious factual
support.
3. Service-Assessment of the Military Interest
At issue when assessing the record will be the determination of
whether the job requirements of a military employee conflict with
sexual expression. The sponsors of the MHDA perceived a direct link
between the dysfunctional sexual-harassment scandals and the stan-
dards embodied in toleration of sexual expression. 326 To the extent the
ideas expressed in the materials that enactments such as the MHDA
target positively endorse either sexual activity or sexual submis-
sion, 27 a threat could be posed to the military's traditional latitude to
establish effective command.328 This possibility stems from the deci-
324. In recognition of this principle, Congress passed a statute that explicitly safeguarded
the ability of service personnel to communicate with members of Congress. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 1034 (1994) (proscribing unjustified impediments to a serviceman's right to communicate with
a member of Congress); see also Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 358-60 (1980) (considering
whether the regulation challenged on First Amendment grounds also violated the statute
explicitly protecting communications between service personnel and congressmen).
325. Compare this requirement to the lack of a record that Judge Scheindlin bemoaned in
General Media Communications v. Perry, 952 F. Supp. 1072, 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) The dissent
from the panel ruling voiced a similar concern. See General Media Communications v. Cohen,
131 F.3d 273, 293 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Significantly, the government offers no evidence, by way of
congressional hearings, official reports, explicit congressional findings of fact, or military judg-
ment to support its claims."). Judge Parker further pointed to the Supreme Court's similar
analysis in its recent consideration of the Communications Decency Act. See id. at 293 (citing
Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2338 n. 24 (1997) (holding that the provisions violated the First
Amendment when "[n'o hearings were held on the provisions that became law")); see also note
34.
326. See Price, supra note 200, at A2 ("After Tailhook and Aberdeen and other sexual-
harassment scandals, there is no question that the United States military needs policies that
support the highest standards of behavior.").
327. See supra note 109.
328. See supra note 29.
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sion to employ integrated training and operational environments.3 29
While significant controversy exists as to the propriety of integrated
training,3 0 little interest exists in separating the sexes thereafter.331
Although not inevitable, the military currently has a policy restricting
sexual activities within units.332 The justification for this stricture is
that sexual relationships can distort the traditional command struc-
ture.333 In public employee speech terms, threats to authoritarian
command constitute workplace disruption. Ultimately, a record
linking pornography to a deleterious impact on the effectiveness of
command to achieve units free of distracting sexual relationships
should suffice to justify reasonable restrictions on these unique
government employees' sexual expression.
VI. CONCLUSION
Applying a standard analogous to government employee speech
analysis to military speech has the advantage of bringing greater
consistency and predictability to this battlefield of First Amendment
jurisprudence. By carving out matters of public concern, the standard
protects speech that is vital to the democratic process. Forging a
doctrine that significantly accounts for legitimate military interests,
either in time of peace or the tumult of crisis, allows the methodology
to be brought to bear in both circumstances with its consistency
promising that First Amendment principles will not be dismissed in a
cloak of non-justiciability.
329. See Guttman, supra note 6, at 20 ("After Tailhook, the military made recruitment of
women a top priority; barriers toppled, policies changed, promotions were spirited through the
pipelines.").
330. See, e.g., Maggie Gallagher, Facts of Life Apply in the Army Too, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Dec. 26, 1997, at B7 ("Separating men and women in basic training, and recruiting more female
trainers, as the panel suggests, will help prevent the sexual abuse scandals that periodically
rock the military."). See supra note 12.
331. Supporters of basic training's resegregation emphasize ensuring equal opportunities
for the sexes in the armed services. See Norman Kempster, Lawmakers Call for Sex-Segregated
Military Training, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 1997, at A24 ("Rep. Roscoe G. Bartlett (R-Md.), chief
sponsor of the proposal, said segregated training would 'provide both men and women the
necessary opportunity to successfully become military personnel without the distractions of
sexuality.' ").
332. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
333. See, e.g., Stone & Komarow, supra note 12, at 1A ("(Alithough the main aim of
the... 'train as we fight' doctrine is to instill teamwork and discipline, the present
organizational structure... is resulting in less discipline, less unit cohesion and more
distraction.").
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Given the limited range of First Amendment freedoms in the
public sector workplace and, by their analogy, the military, the
likelihood that sexual expression would often constitute a matter of
public concern is low. By failing to meet the threshold test of a public
concern, sexual expression would be afforded few First Amendment
protections. Moreover, even if considered a matter of public concern,
the Court's balancing analysis, which factors reasonableness into the
regulatory interest side of the equation, would generally favor the
military. In all other respects, the analysis would be a close call. To
the extent the expression was directed at military issues, both its
systemic value and its disruptive value would fall and rise together.
Nevertheless, judicial review would, at a minimum, require the
development of some record to substantiate the claim of military
necessity so that the response could be termed "reasonable."
Finally, a narrow conception of First Amendment freedoms in
the military should be understood in its broader constitutional con-
text. Military institutions remain creatures of Congress. Moreover,
protection of the free-flow of ideas remains the key value in the sys-
temic approach endorsed and articulated here. While military neces-
sity may justify far less protection for expression in the military
commissary than in the civilian marketplace, the "separate
community" will remain harnessed to a majoritarian institution
driven by deliberative discourse. The constitutional necessity of
raising the armed forces from within civil society means that civilian
political culture will always serve as the ultimate check on military
practice.33 4
Ross G. Shank*
334. See Hirschhorn, supra note 29, at 244 (discussing the role that Congress plays); see
also CNN Worldview: A Different Attitude Towards Adultery in Israeli Army (CNN television
broadcast, June 27, 1997) (Transcript #97062707V18) (discussing the pragmatic limitations on
military practice).
Lt. Shira Bar-Yosef, Israeli Army: "Maybe its OK, maybe its not. But we cannot allow it
to decide if a man or a woman can or cannot get a job, because he's had an affair ......
Kessle (voice-over): "And perhaps the key reason adultery isn't outlawed --2" Dankner:
"Overnight, we will have no officers left in the army. Everyone would submit their res-
ignation. We'll be left only with some religious soldiers. That's all."
Id.
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